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1. Introduction 
In this paper I discuss the art-nature relationship in Greco-Roman antiquity with 
special reference to one important ancient art or technê: mechanics. Although different 
ancient  authors  express  different  views  about  the  goals,  methods,  and  scope  of 
mechanics, they tend to agree in conceiving it as a technê, an art or science, involving a 
combination  of  various  kinds  of  theoretical  and  practical  knowledge.  In  a  range  of 
sources  from  the  third  century  BC  to  the  third  century  AD,  mechanics  is  typically 
described as a technê that includes a wide range of fields, from the theory and practice of 
building machines for lifting heavy objects to the construction of artillery engines and 
automata.
1   
 
This paper addresses two primary questions. First, how did ancient writers on 
mechanics conceive of the relationship of their technê to nature or phusis? Second, what 
did these views on the art-nature relationship imply about the ability of mechanics to 
provide knowledge of nature? According to one line of modern interpretation, advocated 
by F. Krafft in a series of influential publications, mechanics in antiquity was universally 
viewed as bringing about effects that were ‘contrary to nature’ (para phusin); as a result, 
it is claimed, the study of mechanics could yield no knowledge of nature. Krafft often 
describes  the  goal  of  ancient  mechanics  as  the  ‘tricking  of  nature’  (‘Überlistung  der 
Natur’), and claims that it was only in the early modern period – in the work of Galileo in 
particular – that the view arose that mechanics follows nature and its laws rather than 
working  against  it.
2    What  exactly  Krafft  means  by  the  tricking  of  nature  is  not 
immediately clear, but the opposition he sets up between tricking nature and following 
natural laws, as well as his emphasis on the association between mechanics and wonder-
working or trickery that can be found in a number of ancient authors, suggest that he 
understands the tricking of nature to amount to the production of a break or suspension in 
the  order  of  nature,  where  this  is  understood  as  the  domain  of a  regular,  predictable 
                                                          
1For representative discussions of the various branches of ancient mechanics see the opening chapters of 
Pappus, Collectio 8 (pp. 1022 ff. Hultsch) and Proclus, In Prim. Eucl. Elem., pp. 41.3 ff. Friedlein. Similar 
divisions go back to the early Hellenistic period, as shown by the topics covered in Philo of Byzantium’s 
lost Mechanical Syntaxis: the theory of levers, harbor construction, siegecraft, the construction of artillery, 
pneumatics, and the construction of automata.  See Gille 1980, 104-5. 
2Krafft 1967, 27: “Die ‘Mechanik’ galt...in der Antike und im Mittelalter als eine Kunst und hatte als Kunst 
dort einzugreifen, wo die Natur das vom Menschen Erwünschte nicht von sich aus vollbringen konnte. Das 
Künstliche ist damit etwas Nicht-Natürliches, ja etwas Naturwidriges. Im Falle der ‘Mechanik’, der sich 
Mittel und Werkzeuge zur ‘Überlistung’ der Natur bedienenden Kunst der Antike, ist diese Auffassung 
dann  endgültig  erst  von  Galileo  Galilei  und  seinen  Nachfolgern  überwunden  worden,  die  aufzeigten, 
warum man auch mit mechanischen Hilfsmitteln nur etwas erreichen kann, wenn man der Natur folgt, sich 
nach ihren ‘Gesetzen’ richtet. Auch bei der Anwendung einer Maschine geschehe nichts Widernatürliches.” 2 
sequence of cause and effect. On this view the effects brought about by mechanics would 
be ‘beyond nature’ (para phusin) in the sense of being supernatural, and mechanics itself 
would amount to a kind of magic.
3  In other contexts Krafft’s view seems to be the more 
restrained  one that  mechanics  acts  ‘contrary  to  nature’  in  virtue  of  the  fact that  it is 
concerned  with  forced  rather than  natural  motion  in the  Aristotelian  sense.  Since  the 
subject matter of mechanics is limited to forced motion, mechanics is completely distinct 
from physics, the subject of which is natural motion; once again the conclusion is that the 
study of mechanics cannot yield any knowledge of nature.
4  To support this conclusion, 
Krafft appeals to the general claim that because the Greeks viewed nature as an organic 
unity, any artificial intervention in natural processes could only distort the behavior of 
nature rather than helping to reveal it.
5  The possibility that mechanics might provide 
knowledge of nature through its use of mathematics is ruled out by Aristotle’s view of the 
relationship  of  mathematics  to  physics,  which  allegedly  made  it  impossible  for 
mathematics to explain any features of the natural world.
6   
 
I  have  attempted  to  set  out  Krafft’s  interpretation  in  some  detail  because  it 
illustrates a number of assumptions that have strongly colored scholarship on ancient 
mechanics  and  indeed  on  the  art-nature  relationship  in  general,  assumptions  that  are 
deeply problematic if not demonstrably false. To take one example, the notion that the 
Greek (or, less vaguely, the Aristotelian) concept of nature in itself implied that artificial 
intervention could yield no knowledge of nature has recently come under well-justified 
and persuasive criticism.
7  There is ample evidence from all periods of Greek science for 
                                                          
3For the connection between mechanics and magic see Krafft 1973, 7: “Listen und Tricks, Zauberkunst und 
Magie, versteckte Mittel sind die Werkzeuge der ‘Mechaniker’; sie lassen der Natur nicht ihren Lauf, sie 
überlisten sie und bewirken damit etwas gegen sie...” 
4Cf. Krafft 1970, 137: ‘‘‘Physik’ (phusikê epistêmê) behandelt, wie schon das Wort selbst zeigt, die ‘Natur’ 
(phusis) der Dinge, ihr ‘Wesen’ und ihre ‘natürlichen’, ihrer ‘Natur’ gemäßen (Eigen)-Bewegungen, also 
solche Körper, die, wie Aristoteles es definiert, das Prinzip ihrer naturgemäßen Bewegung in sich selbst 
haben, während die ‘Mechanik’, wie wir es besonders aus der Einleitung der Mechanischen Probleme und 
dem Fehlen einer Behandlung des ‘natürlichen’  Falles (Freien Falles) ersehen konnten, ‘naturwidrige’, 
d. h. künstliche Bewegungen behandelt, Bewegungen, zu denen die ‘Natur’ eines Körpers nicht selbst in 
der Lage ist, ja die der ‘Natur’ eines Körpers entgegen wirken und für deren Zustandekommen sich der 
Mensch  auf  kunstvolle  Weise  ‘mechanischer’  Hilfsmittel  (mêchanai)  bedienen  muß.  Die  ‘Mechanik’ 
(mêchanikê  technê)  ist  eine  ‘Kunst’,  die  nach  antiker  Auffassung  deshalb  auch  zur  wissenschaftlichen 
Erkenntnis der ‘Natur’, des ‘natürlichen’ Geschehens nichts Wesentliches beizutragen vermag.” For similar 
remarks  see  Krafft  1973,  11;  1967,  12-13.  Krafft  also  claims  the  existence  of  an  ‘unüberbrückbare 
Schranke’ between physics and mechanics in antiquity (1970, 138). 
5Krafft 1970, 157: “Da dann seit Platon und Aristoteles die ‘Natur’ als eine organische Einheit, als ein 
Ganzes, der Kosmos als ein Lebewesen aufgefaßt wird, kann nämlich die ‘Natur’ auch eines einzelnen 
Dinges nicht isoliert betrachtet werden. Greift der Mensch künstlich (mit oder ohne zusätzliches ‘Mittel’: 
mêchanê) in den organischen Zusammenhang und den ‘natürlichen’ Ablauf ein, so kann er nach dieser 
Auffassung  nicht  mehr  ‘Natur’  erkennen  (Naturwissenschaft  treiben),  sondern  nur  noch  menschlichen 
‘Kunst’. Das Experiment trägt als ein solcher ‘künstlicher’ Eingriff deshalb ebensowenig zur Erkenntnis 
der  ‘Natur’,  zur  ‘Naturwissenschaft’,  bei  wie  eine  ‘Kunst’  und  wird  als  ‘naturwissenschaftliches’ 
Erkenntnismittel abgelehnt oder gar nicht erst in Betracht gezogen” Cf. Krafft 1967, 28. 
6Cf. Krafft  1970,  159:  “Die  Mathematik  gehört  nach  Aristoteles  einem  anderen  Seinsbereiche  als  die 
‘natürlichen’ Dinge an. Sie kann deshalb nichts zur Erkenntnis der ‘Natur’, der Ursachen ‘natürlicher’ 
Vorgänge, beitragen und im sublunaren Bereich nicht einmal der Beschreibung dieser Vorgänge dienen.” 
For similar remarks see Krafft 1967, 30-1. 
7See especially Newman 1997 and 2001. 3 
the idea of a close analogy between art and nature, and for the use of analogies between 
art and nature as a heuristic device for learning about the latter. As far as mechanics itself 
is  concerned,  the  notion  that  ancient  mechanics  was  universally  viewed  as  acting 
‘contrary to nature’ (para phusin) is largely based on an interpretation of the earliest 
extant text devoted to the subject, the Mechanical Problems (Mêchanika Problêmata) 
commonly ascribed to Aristotle in antiquity and early modern times, but now generally 
thought not to be by him.
8  This text opens with a striking passage that describes art in 
general, and mechanics in particular, as bringing about effects that are para phusin:  
 
Among things that occur according to nature (kata phusin), we wonder at 
those whose cause is unknown; among things that occur para phusin, we 
wonder at those that come about by means of art (technê) for the benefit of 
mankind. For in many cases nature acts in a way opposed to what is useful 
for us. For nature always acts in the same way and simply, while what is 
useful  changes  in  many  ways.  Whenever,  then,  it  is  necessary  to  do 
something para phusin, because of the difficulty we are at a loss (aporia) 
and have need of art (technê). For this reason, we also call that part of art 
that assists in such situations (aporiai) a device (mêchanê). For as the poet 
Antiphon said, so it is: “By means of art we gain mastery (kratoumen) over 
things in which we are conquered by nature.” Instances of this are those 
cases in which the lesser master (kratein) the greater, and things possessing a 
small inclination move great weights, and practically all those problems that 
we call mechanical. These are not entirely identical with physical problems, 
nor  are  they  entirely  separate  from  them,  but  they  have  a  share  in  both 
mathematical and physical speculations: for the ‘how’ in them is made clear 
through mathematics, while the ‘about what’ is made clear through physics.
9   
 
A central goal of the present paper is to clarify what exactly the author of the Mechanical 
Problems means in claiming that art produces effects that are para phusin. As already 
noted, this Greek phrase can be understood in a number of distinct senses. In section 3 
below I shall argue that the author’s meaning is best captured by the idea that art brings 
about effects that go ‘beyond nature’ in the sense that they would not be possible without 
the intervention of art. These effects, though they go beyond nature and are in that sense 
unnatural, need not be viewed as acting against nature – whether ‘nature’ is understood 
in the global sense as a universal order of cause and effect, or as the specific principle of 
change present in a particular substance or object. In section 4 I shall argue that despite 
the apparent conflict between art and nature described at the beginning of the Mechanical 
Problems, the author’s notion of the art-nature relationship is in fact well illustrated by 
Aristotle’s  idea  that  art imitates  nature and  brings to  completion  what  nature  cannot. 
Moving  beyond  the  Mechanical  Problems,  the  notion  that  ancient  mechanics  was 
universally  viewed  as  operating  ‘contrary  to  nature’  is  further  undermined  by  a 
consideration of certain branches of mechanics such as the building of automata, which 
                                                          
8I will not go into the question of authorship here; what is important for my purposes is simply that the 
Mechanical Problems clearly lies in the tradition of Aristotelian science. 
9Mech. 847 a 11 - 28. Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. For the Greek text of the 
Mechanical Problems (Mech.) see Apelt 1888. 4 
were explicitly described as imitating nature. In section 5 I will argue that there are two 
primary respects in which ancient mechanics could provide knowledge of nature. First, 
machines  could  serve  as  models  for  understanding  processes  going  on  in  the  natural 
world.  Second,  mechanics  could  yield  knowledge  of  nature  through  the  use  of 
mathematics: mechanics considers certain mathematical properties of physical bodies and 
uses those properties to explain their behavior. 
 
In order to place these observations on mechanics in a broader context, I shall 
begin in section 2 with a brief discussion of the art-nature relationship in two important 
traditions  of  early  Greek  thought,  Hippocratic  medicine  and  Aristotelian  philosophy. 
Both of these lay great weight on the idea that art imitates nature and can therefore be 
used as a means of gaining knowledge of it. Finally, in section 6 I discuss a number of 
attempts from the early modern period to resolve the tensions present in the opening 
passage of the Mechanical Problems, attempts which show some striking similarities to 
the interpretation I propose in section 3.  
 
2. Background 
Before turning to mechanics in particular, it is important to note that the idea of a 
conflict between art and nature is quite difficult to parallel in antiquity. Ancient authors 
were much more likely to stress the parallels between art and nature than to portray them 
as  opposed  to  one  another.  Two  important  traditions  in  early  Greek  thought  provide 
substantial evidence for this claim: Hippocratic medicine and Aristotelian philosophy. In 
this section I therefore present brief and necessarily oversimplified accounts of some of 
the ways in which the art-nature relationship was conceived of in these traditions.  
 
The close connection between art and nature in Hippocratic medicine has two 
principal  aspects.  First,  a  large  number of  Hippocratic  writers  conceive  of  the art  or 
technê of medicine as a systematically organized set of procedures based on a body of 
theoretical  knowledge  of  human  nature  (phusis).  To  be  sure,  different  authors  had 
different conceptions of what this knowledge of human nature amounted to. But many 
Hippocratics agreed that medicine’s claim to be a systematic art or technê depended on 
its having a basis in some general theory of human phusis. One consequence of the view 
that medical practice should be based on a theory of human phusis was the idea that the 
aim of treatment is to restore a patient to his natural condition. Therapy could thus be 
understood as a matter of ‘following nature’ by assisting the patient’s return to his natural 
or normal state; indeed in some passages nature is viewed as possessing the ability to 
bring  itself  back  to  health,  implying that  the  doctor’s  task  is  only to  assist  it  in  this 
process. Second, there is ample evidence in the Hippocratic literature for the procedure of 
drawing analogies with artistic or technological processes as a means of learning about 
human phusis. Again and again the Hippocratics appeal to analogies drawn from the 
realm of technê to elucidate obscure phenomena such as the growth of the embryo or the 
behavior  of the  humors  in the  body.
10    In  one  remarkable  passage, the  author  of  the 
                                                          
10See especially the treatises On Generation, On the Nature of the Child, and On Diseases IV, with the 
commentary of Lonie 1981. 5 
treatise On Regimen explicitly recommends drawing analogies with technê as a method 
of studying the obscure realm of human phusis:  
 
But human beings do not understand how to observe the invisible through 
the visible. For though they make use of arts (technai) that are similar to 
human nature (phusis), they are unaware of it. The mind of the gods taught 
them to imitate (mimeisthai) their own [activities], and though they know 
what they are doing they are ignorant of what they are imitating... But I will 
show that the well-known arts are like the affections of man, both visible 
and invisible.
11   
 
The  author  goes  on  to  suggest  analogies  between  a  wide  variety  of  technological 
procedures and invisible processes taking place inside the human body. Though some of 
these analogies are highly obscure, it is clear that many of them appeal to the idea that 
artistic processes are either closely similar or identical to those that occur in the human 
body; it is because of this that an understanding of technê can be used to gain knowledge 
of human phusis.
12   
 
Turning to Aristotle, it is well known that he distinguishes between natural things 
and artefacts on the ground that the former possess an internal principle of change while 
the latter do not (Phys. 192 b 8 - 32). But it would be a serious mistake to conclude from 
this that Aristotle viewed artefacts as inherently inferior to the products of nature, or held 
that artificial interference with the behavior of a natural object can reveal nothing about 
its nature.
13  Aristotle often emphasizes the similarity of natural and artificial processes. 
In Physics B 8 he famously appeals to the analogy between art and nature to support the 
claim that nature is inherently teleological or end-directed: 
 
Further, where there is an end, all the preceding steps are for the sake of that. 
Now surely as in action, so in nature; and as in nature, so it is in each action, 
if nothing interferes. Now action is for the sake of an end; therefore the 
nature of things also is so. Thus if a house, e.g. had been a thing made by 
nature, it would have been made in the same way as it is now by art; and if 
things made by nature were made also by art, they would come to be in the 
same way as by nature. The one, then, is for the sake of the other; and 
generally art in some cases completes (epiteleitai) what nature cannot bring 
to  a  finish,  and  in  others  imitates  her  (mimeitai).  If,  therefore,  artificial 
products are for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products. The 
relation of the later to the earlier items is the same in both.
14 
 
Two points about this crucial passage deserve special emphasis. First, the context makes 
clear that Aristotle’s notion of imitation goes far beyond mere mimicry. His main purpose 
is to argue that nature, like art, operates in a goal-directed manner, and his point is that 
both natural and artificial processes take place in an ordered sequence in which each 
                                                          
11Hp. Vict. 11-12, 6.486-488 Littré. 
12On this passage cf. Schneider 1989, 208-212; he rightly insists that the analogies imply the existence of 
structural similarities between technê and phusis. 
13See Newman 1997 for another critique of these traditional assumptions. 
14Arist. Phys. 199 a 8 - 20.  Translation Barnes. 6 
stage comes about for the sake of the next. What Aristotle has in mind is thus a close 
analogy between natural and artificial processes.
15 Second, the passage gives a precise 
meaning to the notion that art goes beyond nature. In producing an artefact such as a 
house or a ship, art brings about results that nature itself cannot. But because of the close 
analogy between art and nature, this is really just a matter of bringing to completion what 
nature leaves unfinished. Art, by acting in a natural way – the way nature would act if it 
could generate the products of art – is able to produce results that do not come about by 
nature alone.
16 
   
Aristotle  often  contrasts  art  and  nature  as  external  and  internal  principles  of 
change, respectively, as in the following passage from the Nicomachean Ethics:  
 
All  art  is  concerned  with  coming  into  being,  i.e.  with  contriving  and 
considering how something may come into being which is capable of either 
being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing 
made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, 
by  necessity,  nor  with things  that  do  so  in  accordance  with  nature  (kata 
phusin) (since these have their origin in themselves).
17 
   
To the extent that the art-nature distinction is simply a distinction between external and 
internal sources of change, it allows for a close parallel between natural and artificial 
processes. This parallel is emphasized in Aristotle’s extended account of artificial and 
natural generation in Metaphysics Z 7-9. In both cases a form is realized in matter; in 
artificial generation the form is originally present in the soul of the artisan, while in 
natural generation it originates in the parent. In a sense, then, the form is imposed from 
outside in natural generation as well. A passage of the De Generatione Animalium makes 
a similar point: 
  
Art is the principle and form of the thing that comes to be; but it is located 
elsewhere than in that thing, whereas the movement of nature is located in 
                                                          
15Cf. Phys. 199 b 28 - 9: if the art of shipbuilding were present in the wood, a ship would come to be by 
nature in the same way that it does by art.  
16For a similar interpretation of Aristotle’s remark that art imitates nature or brings to completion what it 
cannot see Schadewaldt 1970a, 900-901:“Dieser Satz meint natürlich nicht, daß die Technik lediglich die 
Natur  nachäffe  (obgleich  die  Technik,  wenn  ich  recht  unterrichtet  bin,  in  vielen  Zweigen  auch  heute 
wirklich zunächst einmal die Natur befragt). Er meint, wenn man ihn richtig faßt: daß die Technik in 
Analogie  zur  Natur  handelt,  daß  sie  in  ihrem  eigenen  Tun  die  zunächst  einmal  grundwissenschaftlich 
erforschten Prinzipien der Natur befolgt. In immer neuen Kombinationen und Gestaltungen auf Grund der 
zunächst einmal erforschten Prinzipien der Natur gelangt die Technik auf ihre partielle Weise zu neuen 
Kombinationen, die auf den Menschen abgestellt sind. In diesem Sinne sagt auch Aristoteles, daß ‘die 
Technik weiter und zu Ende führe, was die Natur von sich aus bisher noch nicht bewerkstelligt’ hat. Dieses 
Weiter- und Zu-Ende-Führen ist das, worin die Technik in ihrer Weise sich mit Recht der Natur ‘überlegen’ 
fühlen darf. Im ganzen aber beruht eben diese ihre ‘technische’ Überlegenheit darin, daß sich die Technik 
zunächst einmal der Natur einschmiegt, ihr gehorcht und auf sie hinhört, so wie das treffend Bacon gesagt 
hat: natura parendo vincitur (original emphasis).” Cf. also Schneider 1989, 214-5. 
17Arist. EN 6, 1140 a 10 - 16. Translation Barnes. 7 
the  thing  itself  that  comes  to  be,  and  is  derived  from  another  natural 
organism which possessed the form in actuality.
18   
 
Although  Aristotle  contrasts  art  and  nature  here,  this  remark  in  fact  comes  at  the 
conclusion of an extended analogy between them. Just as hot and cold do not suffice of 
themselves  to  temper  iron  in  the  way  necessary  to  make  a  sword  but  must  act  in 
accordance with the form specified by art, so in the formation of the embryo the action of 
hot and cold will only generate the right parts if directed by the form supplied by the 
parent (734 b 28 - 735 a 3). The upshot is to stress the similarity of natural and artificial 
generation, even if the source of change in the former is internal rather than external.  
 
In  some  Aristotelian  passages  the  boundary  between  artificial  and  natural 
processes is quite unclear. Important evidence of this is provided by Meteorology IV, a 
text  whose  authorship  is  disputed  but  which  (like  the  Mechanical  Problems)  clearly 
belongs  in  the  tradition  of  Aristotelian  philosophy  and  science.  The  book  discusses 
various transformations between natural substances, especially those brought about by 
hot and cold. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the process of coction or pepsis (defined at 379 b 
18-19 as  “perfection  brought  about  by  a  thing’s  own  natural  heat”)  and  its  various 
species, which are said to be ripening, boiling, and roasting. In the author’s usage, pepsis 
is thus a generic term that subsumes artificial as well as natural processes. The author 
builds on ordinary usage, in which pepsis refers to a wide variety of natural changes such 
as the ripening of fruit and digestion as well as artificial processes such as cooking. Two 
passages in the discussion of pepsis make explicit reference to the art-nature relationship. 
First, in concluding his discussion of boiling the author remarks that “Such, then, is what 
is called coction (pepsis) by boiling: and it makes no difference whether it takes place in 
artificial or natural instruments (organois), for the cause will be the same in all cases.”
19  
Second, in the discussion of roasting (defined at 381 a 23-4 as “coction by extrinsic dry 
heat”) he states:  
 
Now roasting and boiling are artificial processes, but, as we have said, the 
same general kind of thing is found in nature too. The affections produced 
are similar though they lack a name; for art imitates (mimeitai) nature. For 
instance, the coction (pepsis) of food in the body is similar to boiling, for it 
takes place in a hot and moist medium and the agent is the heat of the body.
20   
 
While the first of these passages suggests that there is no difference between artificial and 
natural processes, the second seems to indicate that they are closely similar rather than 
identical: boiling and roasting have natural counterparts for which there is no name but 
which are similar to them in kind or eidos. But whatever the author’s exact conception of 
the relationship between artificial and natural processes, these passages clearly imply that 
the study of the former can yield an understanding of the latter, whether by analogy or 
direct inference.
21  The view that artificial processes are either closely similar or identical 
                                                          
18Arist. GA 735 a 2 - 4. 
19Meteor. IV, 381 a 9 - 12. 
20Meteor. IV, 381 b 3 - 9. 
21On the influence of these passages on early modern alchemy, see Newman 2001. 8 
to natural ones underlies Aristotle’s extensive appeal to analogies between technê and 
phusis, which are especially common in the biological works. Because the processes of 
art  are  similar  or  identical  to  those  of  nature,  art  can  serve  as  a  model  for  the 
understanding of nature.
22   
 
To  be  sure,  the  art-nature  relationship  was  not  always  described  as  one  of 
imitation. Near the end of the Hippocratic treatise On the Art, the author states that in the 
case of diseases that affect the internal organs, medicine makes use of visible symptoms 
to diagnose the patient’s condition. But when nature does not reveal such symptoms of its 
own accord, the art has discovered means of compelling it to do so:  
 
When this information is not revealed, and nature itself will yield nothing of 
its  own  accord,  medicine  has  found  means  of  compulsion  (anagkai), 
whereby nature is constrained (biastheisa), without being harmed, to give up 
its secrets; when these are given up it makes clear, to those who know about 
the art, what ought to be done.
23   
 
By administering certain foods and drinks or prescribing certain exercises, the doctor can 
force the patient’s phusis to give evidence of its condition. The language of this passage, 
which suggests the image of nature undergoing torture, could hardly be more striking. 
Yet  while  it  portrays  the  art-nature  relationship  as  one  of  antagonism  rather  than 
imitation, the passage does not suggest that the secrets nature is compelled to reveal are 
in any way unnatural. The point is simply, as Heraclitus put it, that “nature loves to 
hide.”
24  Nature does not reveal its secrets without being subject to compulsion, but that 
does not make them any less a manifestation of nature. Here, then, we have a clear case 
where  artificial  modification  and  even  compulsion  must  be  used  in  order  to  gain 
knowledge about nature; there is no suggestion that such compulsion in any way distorts 
the information that it provides.  
 
In conclusion, the notion that art imitates nature plays an important role in both 
Hippocratic medicine and Aristotelian philosophy. This notion in turn rests on the close 
similarity between natural and artificial processes. As Aristotle put it, art can go beyond 
nature, but in doing so it acts in the way that nature would act, if it could bring about such 
results. Both Aristotle and the Hippocratics make extensive use of technical analogies as 
a  means  of  learning about phusis.  There  is,  then,  no a  priori  reason  to  suppose  that 
mechanics could yield no knowledge of nature simply because it was viewed as a technê. 
Indeed the evidence discussed in this section suggests exactly the opposite conclusion.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22For Aristotle’s use of technological analogies cf. Bourgey 1975, Lloyd 1966. 
23Hp. de Arte 13, 240.10-13 Jouanna, 6.24 Littré. 
24Fr. 123 Diels-Kranz (DK). 9 
3. Art and Nature in the Mechanical Problems 
With these considerations in mind we may turn to the interpretation of the art-
nature  relationship  in  the  Mechanical  Problems.  The  author  begins  by  distinguishing 
between two kinds of phenomena that excite wonder: those that come about ‘according to 
nature’  (kata  phusin)  and  whose  cause is  unknown,  and  those  that  come  about  para 
phusin by means of art (technê), for the benefit of human beings. Nature often acts in a 
way that is opposed to what is beneficial for human beings; this is because it always acts 
in the same way, while human needs vary widely. Nature’s constant, unvarying activity 
leads to difficulties; confronted with these, human beings are often at a loss (aporia) and 
must make use of art (technê). Hence the part of technê that provides assistance in such 
situations is called a ‘device’ (mêchanê). A quotation from the poet Antiphon sums up 
the author’s view of the art-nature relationship: art enables human beings to triumph over 
matters in which they are conquered by nature.  
 
Before going further it is essential to distinguish a number of senses that might be 
conveyed by the phrase para phusin in Greek. At least four are relevant. (1) First, para 
phusin may refer to something that is ‘beyond nature’ in the quite strong sense of beyond 
the order of nature, understood as a domain of the orderly sequence of cause and effect: 
in other words, the supernatural. On such a view mechanics would amount to a kind of 
magic. (2) Second, para phusin might refer to something that is contrary to a specific 
nature, understood as an internal principle of change in the Aristotelian sense. As is well 
known, Aristotle uses the phrase para phusin to refer to motions that are contrary to the 
natural  motion  of  an  element:  fire  moves  upwards kata  phusin  and  downwards para 
phusin.
25  In  some  Aristotelian  contexts  the  distinction  between para  phusin  and kata 
phusin  motion  amounts  to  a  distinction  between  motion  caused  by  external  force  or 
compulsion (bia) and that which is caused by an internal principle of change.
26 It is in 
any case clear that para phusin in this sense involves no break or rupture in the order of 
nature; indeed Aristotle himself points to the existence of natural motions that are para 
phusin, e.g. lightning that moves downwards despite its fiery nature.
27 (3) Third, para 
phusin in Aristotle often refers to what is unusual, while kata phusin refers to what occurs 
usually or for the most part. This usage is particularly common in Aristotle’s biological 
works, where para phusin is often used of monstrous births.
28 Again, however, it is clear 
that Aristotle does not understand such phenomena as lying outside the domain of nature.  
A passage of the De Generatione Animalium makes the point especially clearly:  
 
A  monstrosity  (teras)  belongs  to  the  class  of  things  contrary  to  nature 
(para phusin), although it is not contrary to nature in its entirety but only 
to nature as it holds for the most part.  As for the nature which is always 
and by necessity, nothing occurs contrary to that: unnatural occurrences 
are found only among those things that happen as they do for the most 
                                                          
25Cf. Phys. 230 b 10 ff. 
26Cf. Cael. 300 a 23: to de biai kai para phusin tauton. 
27Meteor. 342 a 12-16. For the general point that para phusin motion does not violate the order of nature 
see Schneider 1989, 260-1; Micheli 1995, 30. 
28Cf. GA 772 a 36-37, where monstrous births are said to come about “contrary to what happens for the 
most part and usually'' (para to hôs epi to polu kai to eiôthos). 10 
part, but which may happen otherwise.  For even in these cases, something 
comes about that is contrary to this particular order, but never in a merely 
random fashion; thus it seems less of a monstrosity (teras), because even 
that which is contrary to nature (para phusin) is, in a way, in accordance 
with nature (kata phusin) (i.e. whenever the formal nature does not master 
the material nature).
29 
 
Though para phusin in virtue of being unusual, monstrous births are also kata phusin, 
both  in  the  sense  that  they  come  about  in  nature  and  in  the  sense  that  they  can  be 
explained in terms of the behavior of specific natures: for they come about when the 
formal nature fails to master the material, and are thus in accordance with the nature of 
the elements.
30  (4) Finally, para phusin might be taken to refer to what goes ‘beyond 
nature’ – not in the strong sense that it lies outside nature understood as the domain of a 
regular sequence of cause and effect, but in the sense of something that nature cannot or 
does not do without the intervention of art. In this section I aim to show that it is this last 
sense  that  best  captures  the  author’s  conception  of  mechanical  phenomena  and  their 
relationship  to  nature.  Art  in  general,  and  mechanics  in  particular,  go  beyond  what 
unaided nature can achieve – but they do not lie outside the domain of nature, and they do 
not even necessarily involve forced motion in the Aristotelian sense of motion contrary to 
a thing’s specific nature. 
 
With  these  distinctions  in  mind  we may  now  turn  to  the interpretation  of the 
Mechanical Problems itself. At the opening of the text art is described as bringing about 
effects that are para phusin, and art and nature are opposed to one another. But it is 
immediately evident that this is in fact an opposition between nature and human needs: 
art acts to benefit human beings, while nature often behaves in ways that are ‘opposite’ or 
‘contrary’ (hupenantion) to what is useful for mankind. And this in turn is explained in 
terms of another opposition: nature always acts in the same way and ‘simply’ (haplôs), 
while what is useful varies in many ways (pollachôs). Thus the opposition between art 
and  nature  comes  down  to  a  contrast  between  the  varied  complexity  of  art  and  the 
simplicity and constancy of nature. Art is more complex than nature and brings about 
effects that are beneficial for human beings; in so doing it acts para phusin, but this does 
not imply that it works against nature. The contrast between the simplicity of nature and 
the complexity of art rather suggests that art works by making creative use of nature’s 
                                                          
29Arist. GA 770 b 9 - 17. 
30Cf. Phys. 197 b 32 - 37, where Aristotle states that the difference between chance (tuchê) and spontaneity 
(to automaton) is especially clear in the case of things that come about by nature: “The difference between 
spontaneity and what results by chance is greatest in things that come to be by nature (phusei); for when 
anything comes to be contrary to nature (para phusin), we do not say that it came to be by chance, but by 
spontaneity. Yet strictly this too is different from the spontaneous proper; for the cause of the latter is 
external, that of the former internal” (translation Barnes). Here again we have an example of phenomena 
which, though they come about by nature, are also para phusin. Both chance and spontaneity are concerned 
with the production of end-like results; the difference between them is that the former is restricted to results 
that could be brought about by human choice (cf. 197 a 36 ff.).  Thus what Aristotle is referring to are end-
like results that arise in nature but are produced in an unusual or exceptional fashion; Ross is probably 
correct to argue that the reference is to spontaneous generation, in which normal offspring are produced in a 
way that deviates from the usual process of generation from seed (Ross 1936, 524). 11 
constant, regular behavior to bring about beneficial effects. To be sure, the behavior of 
nature leads to difficulty, which can only be overcome by means of art: “Whenever, then, 
it is necessary to do something para phusin, because of the difficulty we are at a loss 
(aporia) and have need of art (technê).” But there is no need to understand this difficulty 
as the result of nature’s active resistance to the efforts of art; the point is simply that it is 
challenging to adapt or direct nature’s constant course toward the diversity of human 
needs. Rather than describing a struggle between art and nature, the opening sentences of 
the  Mechanical  Problems  in  fact  suggest  the  ability  of  art  to  go  beyond  nature  by 
producing more complex effects that are also beneficial for human beings.  
 
The notion that art aims at an end that is beneficial for human beings is deeply 
rooted in the tradition of Greek thought about technê. The same is true of the idea that 
technê enables human beings to escape from a situation of need or helplessness (aporia), 
and that it does so by means of a ‘device’ or mêchanê. In Greek literature of the fifth and 
fourth centuries BC the term mêchanê commonly refers to a means, device, or stratagem, 
whether  physical  or  intellectual,  that  enables  a  person  to  escape  from  a  situation  of 
difficulty. Conversely, the term amêchania refers to helplessness in such a situation. Two 
familiar passages from fifth-century tragedy provide good illustrations of this complex of 
ideas. (1) In the Prometheus Bound attributed to Aeschylus, the character Prometheus 
describes how human beings originally lived a helpless existence, lacking all the benefits 
of technology, and how he enabled them to rise above this primitive state by discovering 
the arts (technai): astronomy, counting, writing, the domestication of animals, seafaring, 
medicine,  prophecy,  and  mining  (447ff.).  Yet  despite  these  discoveries  he  lacks  the 
ability to free himself from imprisonment at the hands of Zeus: “Wretched I am: such are 
the means (mêchanêmata) I discovered for mankind, yet I have no skill (sophisma) to rid 
myself of the present calamity” (469-471). Prometheus’ mêchanêmata are ‘means’ that 
assist  human  beings  in  a  condition  of  need.
31    (2)  The  first  stasimon  of  Sophocles’ 
Antigone (332ff.) celebrates human intelligence as the faculty that enabled human beings 
to  discover  the  arts  and  overcome  the  dangers  of  a  hostile  natural  world.  Man  the 
‘skillful’ (periphradês) has devised means of capturing all manner of animals; by means 
of ‘skillful contrivances’ (mêchanai) he is able to overcome (kratein) wild beasts (342ff.). 
With the aid of the arts (technai) man is ‘all-resourceful’ (pantoporos) and goes to meet 
nothing in the future ‘without resource’ (aporos); medicine even has the ability to deal 
with ‘unmanageable’ (amêchanôn) diseases, and its power is limited only by the certainty 
of death (360-364). It is the inventive ingenuity associated with mêchanê that enables 
human beings to discover the arts: “Clever (sophon) beyond hope is the contrivance of 
his art (to mêchanoen technas), and he advances sometimes to evil, at other times to 
good.”
32  In these and many other passages, mêchanê and related terms convey the ideas 
of inventiveness, flexibility, and adaptability to different circumstances – qualities that fit 
very well with the contrast between the uniformity of nature and the diversity of human 
needs stressed at the opening of the Mechanical Problems. A mêchanê is a means or 
                                                          
31Cf. also Prom. 476-477: “Hear the rest  and you shall wonder all the more  at the  arts (technai) and 
resources  (poroi)  I  have  devised”;  506:  “All  the  arts  (technai)  have  come  to  human  beings  from 
Prometheus.” Prom. 109-110 describes fire, Prometheus’ key discovery, as a “great resource (poros)” and 
“teacher of all the arts.” 
32Soph. Ant. 365-7. 12 
instrument that enables  human  beings  to  make  creative  use  of circumstances  at  their 
disposal to attain an end that would otherwise be impossible to achieve.
33   
 
In  some  contexts  mêchanê  carries  strong  connotations  of  trickery  or  deception.
34  
Clearly the kind of inventive ingenuity associated with the term was sometimes viewed 
as suspicious or devious. Yet already in Herodotus and the Hippocratic writers mêchanê 
is used of a physical device or machine, with no connotations of trickery or deceit; in 
such contexts, however, it is often implicit that the device in question makes it possible to 
attain a goal that could not otherwise be achieved.
35  To conclude from the fact that 
mêchanê  sometimes  has  connotations  of  trickery  or  deception  that  the  author  of  the 
Mechanical  Problems  viewed  mechanics  as  an  art  of  tricking  nature  would  be  quite 
unjustified. There is no reason to import the idea of ‘trick’ or ‘ruse’ into the present 
passage: a mêchanê is simply a device or means that enables human beings to direct the 
constant, regular course of nature towards their more complex needs.
36   
 
The author continues with a quotation from the poet Antiphon: by means of art 
human beings triumph (kratein) over things in which they are conquered (nikômetha) by 
nature. The language of triumph (kratein) and victory (nikômetha) suggests the image of 
art struggling with and conquering a hostile nature. But Antiphon does not actually state 
that art conquers nature, and in fact the idea expressed by his remark is rather more 
                                                          
33For other examples of mêchanê as a ‘means’ or ‘Hilfsmittel’ cf. Aesch. Sept. 208f.; Hdt. 2.181; Eur. 
Phoen. 890, Hel. 1034; Hp.VM 19; Aristoph. Thesm. 765; Plat. Apol. 39a. At Gorg. 512b Plato cites the 
engineer or mêchanopoios along with the general and the sea captain as people whose function is to rescue 
individuals from situations of difficulty. For the connection between mêchanê and poros cf. Eur. Med. 260, 
Hel. 813; Plat. Crat. 409d, 425d. For the adaptability of mêchanê cf. the use of the term with the verb 
plekein ‘to weave’ (e.g. Eur. Andr. 66, 995; Or. 1423) and the adjective poikilos ‘varied’ (e.g. Soph. OC 
762). 
34See LSJ s.v. II, noting that the sense of trickery or deception is characteristic of the plural mêchanai 
(‘shifts, devices, wiles’). 
35See Hdt. 2.125 for mêchanê as a  crane or other lifting device used in the building of the pyramids; 
Hp. Fract. 30,  Art. 72  for  mêchanê  as  a  device  (e.g. a  lever)  used  to  treat  fractures  and  dislocations. 
Hp. Fract. 30 states that mechanical methods should only be used when human strength is insufficient to 
deal with a fracture. For mêchanê of a construction cf. Aeschylus’ reference to Xerxes’ bridge across the 
Hellespont as laoporoi mêchanai (Pers. 105-6; Pers. 722 remarks that Xerxes bridged the Hellespont by 
means of mêchanai). In Thucydides mêchanê is regularly used of a siege engine (2.76, 3.51, 4.13, 8.100). 
On these passages cf. Schneider 1989, 220: “Der terminus technicus wahrt den älteren Wortsinn insofern, 
als es sich um Instrumente handelt, ohne die der Mensch einen bestimmten Zweck nicht erreichen kann.” 
Elsewhere mêchanê refers to a theatrical device used to make gods appear in the air; cf. Plat. Crat. 425d, 
where it is remarked that tragic poets resort to a mêchanê of this type when they are at a loss (aporôsin) 
about how to resolve the plot of the drama. The verb mêchanaomai, though it sometimes means to plot or 
intrigue, is often used quite neutrally to mean prepare or contrive in a skilful manner (e.g. Hdt. 1.123, 
where it is paired with the verb epitechnasthai, ‘to devise with skill’) or by the use of mechanical devices 
(e.g. Hp. Fract. 30, 31; Art. 74). 
36On the meaning of mêchanê and related terms see especially Schadewaldt 1970b, 914, accepting the 
derivation of mêchanê from the Doric word mêchos (‘means, expedient, remedy’, not ‘trick’) and taking the 
basic  sense  of  the  term  to  be  ‘‘‘Abhilfe’,  ‘kluger  Ausweg’,  ‘klug  ergriffenes  Mittel’,  mit  dem  man 
irgendeiner  Sache  beikommt.”  Krafft’s  remarks  (1967,  15  f.;  1970,  140  f.;  1973,  5  –  the  latter  two 
discussions add nothing substantial to the first) are now superseded by those of Schneider (1989, 217-222) 
and,  most  recently,  Micheli  (1995,  9-20).    Micheli  also  quite  rightly  emphasizes  that  mêchanê  at  the 
opening of the Mechanical Problems has no connotations of deception or trickery (1995, 28).  13 
precise: technê  enables  human  beings  to  overcome  natural  disadvantages  and  thus  to 
attain control and mastery over the natural world. The background to Antiphon’s remark 
is  a  view  of  the  origins  of  culture  that  was  widely  shared  in  the  fifth  century  BC, 
according to which human beings are described as struggling to overcome the dangers of 
a hostile environment. In one scenario that can be traced back to fifth-century sources, 
human beings are said to be inferior to animals in physical characteristics such as speed 
and agility, but to make up for this by their intellect and the development of technology.
37  
A similar picture is suggested by the first stasimon of Sophocles’ Antigone: through his 
amazing  intelligence,  man  has  developed  the  ability  to  overcome  the  dangers  of  the 
natural world; he ‘masters’ (kratein) wild beasts by means of ‘devices’ (mêchanai). The 
idea that art enables human beings to overcome natural limitations and to achieve control 
and mastery over the natural world does not in itself imply anything about how it does so. 
In particular, it does not imply that art causes a break or rupture in the natural order of 
cause and effect (para phusin in sense 1 as defined above), or even that it acts against the 
natural  tendencies  of  particular  objects  or  substances  (para  phusin  in  sense  2).  Art 
‘conquers’ nature by enabling human beings to modify nature’s behavior in beneficial 
ways, and thus to overcome their natural limitations. Once again the idea is that art goes 
beyond nature by producing beneficial effects that nature would not if left to itself. It is 
notable  that  in  contrast  to  some  fifth-century  sources,  the  author  of  the  Mechanical 
Problems does not portray nature as a hostile force that threatens the very existence of 
humanity. For him the opposition between nature and human needs arises solely from the 
contrast between the constancy and uniformity of the former and the complexity and 
diversity of the latter.
38   
 
Up to this point the author’s remarks have been concerned with art in general 
rather  than  mechanics  in  particular.  Next,  at  847  a  22  ff., he  attempts  to  define  the 
character of mechanics more precisely. Mechanical problems are those in which “the 
lesser master (kratei) the greater, and things possessing a small inclination (ropê) move 
great weights.” This builds on the idea of overcoming natural disadvantages expressed in 
the Antiphon quote. Though the strength of human beings is limited by nature, these 
limits can be exceeded by means of mechanics, which makes it possible to move great 
weights with only a small force. Additionally, this way of describing mechanical effects 
implies that they are para phusin in the third sense distinguished above, the unusual or 
paradoxical. It is normal or natural for a greater force to ‘master’ a lesser, and for large 
weights to be moved by large forces; mechanics brings about a reversal of this situation. 
What distinguishes mechanical effects is not so much that they involve forced motion in 
the Aristotelian sense (para phusin in sense 2); the emphasis, rather, is on the fact that 
they bring about a reversal of the normal relationship between forces.
39   
 
                                                          
37Cf. Anaxagoras fr. 21b DK and the story of Prometheus and Epimetheus as told in Plato’s Protagoras 
(320 c ff.). 
38Cf.  Schneider  1989,  236;  256  n. 177  (rightly  insisting,  against  Vernant  1957,  that  the  Mechanical 
Problems does not describe a “combat de la technê contre le phusis.”) 
39Cf. Piccolomini 1565, 7-8: Haec itaque, cum ui quadam contingant, praeter naturam dicuntur fieri, atque 
horum  causam,  hoc  est  ipsam  uiolentiam,  cum  uel  ignoramus,  uel  minorem  arbitramur  quam  effectus 
appareant, miramur ocius (my emphasis). 14 
After a brief remark on the relationship between mechanics, mathematics, and 
physics  (to  which  I  will  return  below)  the  author  turns  to  the  discussion  of  circular 
motion, which he claims to be the fundamental explanation of practically all mechanical 
phenomena. The remainder of the introductory section (847 a 28 - 848 a 37) establishes 
an association between wonder and the strange or atopon, and an opposition between 
both these ideas and the notions of nature (phusis) and cause (aitia). The author begins by 
mentioning the lever as a paradigm example of a mechanical device: it enables a large 
weight to be moved by a small force, even though its own weight must be moved in 
addition. Again, what is emphasized is not that the lever causes a weight to move in a 
way that is contrary to its natural inclination (para phusin in sense 2); the point is rather 
that it reverses the normal (i.e. natural) relationship between forces (para phusin in sense 
3). Hence the operation of the lever appears strange or atopon (847 a 28 - b 15). But in 
fact it can be explained by reference to the circle:  
 
Now the primary cause (tês aitias tên archên) of all such phenomena is the 
circle;  and  this  is  reasonable,  for  it  is  in  no  way  strange  (atopon)  that 
something  wondrous  (thaumaston)  should  result  from  something  more 
wondrous (thaumasiôteron), and the most wondrous thing (thaumasiôtaton) 
is the combination of opposites with one another. The circle is made up of 
such opposites, for to begin with it is composed of both the moving and the 
stationary, whose natures (phusis) are opposed to one another. So that when 
one  reflects  on  this,  there  is  less  reason  to  wonder  (thaumazein)  at  the 
oppositions that occur in connection with it.
40   
 
The lever is both ‘strange’ (atopon) and ‘wondrous’ (thaumaston). In part, its wondrous 
character is explained by something even more wondrous: the circle, in which opposites 
are combined with one another. Yet the circle itself is said to be much less wondrous 
once  its  nature  as  a  combination  of  opposites  is  understood.  Since  the  circle  is  the 
ultimate explanation of all mechanical phenomena, the upshot is that a machine like the 
lever is no longer strange or wondrous once its operation has been explained in terms of 
circular motion. The wondrous properties of the circle include (1) the presence of both 
concave and convex in the circumference (847 b 23 - 848 a 3) and (2) the fact that it 
moves simultaneously in opposite directions, both forward and backward (848 a 3 - 10; 
the idea seems to be that a point on a circle moves in the opposite direction from the point 
diametrically  opposed  to  it  when  the  circle  rotates;  cf.  848  a  19  ff.).  But  the  most 
important reason why the circle is a source of wonders in fact has nothing to do with this 
mysterious union of opposites: as it rotates, a point farther from the center moves more 
quickly than one closer to the center (848 a 14 - 19). At 848 a 11 - 14 the author expands 
on his earlier remark that the circle is the primary cause of all mechanical phenomena:  
 
The things that occur with the balance can be referred to the circle, and those 
that occur with the lever to the balance; while practically everything else 
concerned with mechanical motions can be referred to the lever.  
 
                                                          
40Mech. 847 b 15 - 23. 15 
This suggests a highly systematic procedure of explaining all mechanical phenomena in 
terms of circular motion. Since the operation of the lever is explained by reference to the 
balance, and that of the balance by reference to the circle, it is only necessary to show 
how a particular mechanical phenomenon can be analyzed as the operation of a lever in 
order  to  explain  it  in  terms  of  the  circle.  In  this  sense  the  circle  is  the  fundamental 
explanation  of  all  mechanical  phenomena,  making  their  character  as  ‘wonders’  only 
apparent.  
 
The final part of the introductory section (848 a 19 - 37) describes a mechanical 
device whose operation depends on the fact that the circle combines opposite movements. 
The exact nature and function of this machine are unclear. However, it is apparent that it 
involves a number of circles placed along a line and in contact with one another, so that 
when the first one rotates it causes the second to turn in the opposite direction, and so 
forth. The section concludes with the following important remark:  
 
Craftsmen, seizing on this natural property (phusis) of the circle, construct 
an instrument by concealing the principle (archê), so that only the wondrous 
character (to thaumaston) of the machine (mêchanêma) is apparent, while its 
cause (aition) is unclear.
41 
   
Here again the the ideas of nature, principle, and cause are associated with one another 
and opposed to wonder. The operation of this machine is wondrous only if the causal 
principle (archê) that explains it is concealed. Moreover the machine is constructed not 
by working against the nature (phusis) of the circle but by making creative use of it. If 
there is trickery in mechanics, it is not trickery of nature but trickery of the ignorant 
observer who is unaware of the true explanation of mechanical phenomena.
42   
                                                          
41Mech. 848 a 34 - 37. 
42See Micheli 1995, 34. For an example of similar trickery of the ignorant observer cf. 849 b 34 - 850 a 2: 
sellers of purple attempt to distort the readings of balances by changing the suspension point or the weight 
of one of the arms. For a further example of the association of the strange or atopon and wonder (to 
thaumaston) cf. 855 a 28 ff. (a description of the paradoxes involved in the ‘wheel of Aristotle’), where the 
author  goes  on  to  give the  cause  (aitia)  at  855  b  32  ff.  I  do  not  mean  to  deny  that  trickery  and  the 
production of wonder were important goals in certain branches of ancient mechanics. Thus Pappus states 
that the practitioners of a number of branches of ancient mechanics were known as ‘wonder-workers’ 
(1024.24-28 Hultsch): "The ancients also call the wonder-workers (thaumasiourgoi) mechanicians. Some 
practice their art (philotechnousin) by means of air, as does Hero in his Pneumatics; others seem to imitate 
the motions of living things through ropes and cables, as does Hero in his Automata and Balances; still 
others make use of bodies carried on water, as Archimedes does in his Floating Bodies, or water-clocks, as 
Hero does in his Water-Clocks, which is evidently connected with the theory of the sundial (gnômonikê)." 
In Proclus’ account (In Prim. Eucl. Elem., 41.3 ff. Friedlein) the production of wonders (thaumatopoiikê) is 
a major component of the science of mechanics; this includes the manufacture of (a) devices based on air, 
as  described  by  Hero  and  Ctesibius  (i.e. pneumatics),  (b)  devices  based  on  inclinations  (ropai),  with 
equilibrium producing rest and lack of equilibrium motion, (c) devices that imitate (apomimeisthai) living 
things through ropes and cables (i.e. the building of automata). As both Pappus and Proclus indicate, the 
production of wonders was particularly associated with the building of automata and pneumatic devices. It 
is  clear  from  Hero’s  remarks  in  the  introductions  to  his  works  on  automata  and  pneumatics  that  the 
production of stunning or remarkable effects was an explicit goal of these branches of the mechanical 
technê; cf. Aut. 1, Pneum. 1, and, for a later example, the passage from Cassiodorus discussed in section 4 
below. What I wish to emphasize is simply that there was nothing mysterious or inexplicable about the 16 
 
Thus, while the author of the Mechanical Problems emphasizes the wondrous 
character of mechanical phenomena, it should be clear that this is not because he thinks 
that  they  fall  outside  the  domain  of  nature  understood  as  the  realm  of  the  regular 
progression  of  cause  and  effect  (i.e. para  phusin  in  sense  1).  Such  phenomena  are 
wondrous because they are unusual or paradoxical (para phusin in sense 3), and their 
wondrous  character  disappears  once  they  have  been  explained.  The  author’s  attitude 
toward wonders is similar to that of other early Greek thinkers committed to the view that 
all  phenomena  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  natural  causes.  Within  this  framework, 
wonders constituted a class of unusual, problematic phenomena that could in principle be 
explained, and which provided a stimulus to scientific inquiry.
43  The idea is of course 
Aristotelian.  In  the  Metaphysics  Aristotle  identifies  the  wonder  felt  in  response  to 
phenomena such as eclipses as the starting point of philosophy and science; he goes on to 
mention automata as a paradigm example of a device that is wondrous only to those who 
do not understand the cause (aitia) that explains its operation. Once this cause is grasped, 
such devices are no more wondrous than the incommensurability of the diagonal to a 
person trained in geometry; indeed nothing is more wondrous to a geometer than the 
notion that the diagonal is commensurable with the side.
44  The notion that the wonder of 
mechanical phenomena disappears once they have been explained tends to break down 
the barrier between the artificial and the natural set up in the opening sentence of the 
Mechanical Problems. For it turns out that the effects produced by art, just like natural 
phenomena, are wondrous only insofar as their causes are unknown.
45   
 
After this introduction, the author discusses 35 ‘problems’ or puzzling mechanical 
phenomena.  Many  of  these  are  drawn  from  the  experience  of  everyday  life  or 
technological  procedures;  others  are  more  theoretical  in  nature.  By  far  the  longest 
discussion is that of problem 1, which is devoted to explaining the alleged fact that larger 
balances are more accurate than smaller ones. The reason for this is the property of the 
circle mentioned already at 848 a 14 - 19: of two points lying on the same radius, the 
point farther from the center travels faster as the circle rotates. In problem 1, however, the 
author attempts to explain why this is so. His discussion raises a number of difficulties 
that I cannot discuss here. What is important for present purposes is that he analyzes 
circular motion into a combination of ‘natural’ (kata phusin) motion along the tangent 
and motion para phusin towards the center. The basic idea underlying his explanation is 
simple: because the motion of a point on a longer radius is less deflected (ekkrouesthai) 
towards the center than the motion of a point on a shorter radius, it travels more quickly, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
operation of any of these mechanical devices for those with the requisite knowledge, and that the written 
literature  on  mechanics  was  dedicated  to  transmitting  such  knowledge.  Cf. the  remarks  of  Aristotle 
discussed  in  the  next  paragraph,  as  well  as  ps.-Alex.,  Quaest.,  Pr. 32  -  34  Ideler:  “For  the  craftsman 
(technitês) who has constructed a mechanical device (ergon ti mêchanikon) knows all the causes (aitiai) of 
its activities, while the lay person (idiôtês) is completely ignorant of these causes.” 
43Cf.  Lloyd  1979,  51-2,  referring  to  the  notion  that  all  phenomena  have  a  natural  cause:  “  ‘Marvels’ 
(thaumata) and ‘monsters’ (terata) then pick out phenomena that are unusual but in principle intelligible, 
even if not yet understood." 
44Arist. Metaph. 983 a 12 - 20. 
45Cf. Micheli 1995, 141-3, arguing (I believe incorrectly) that the wonder of mechanical phenomena is not 
due solely to ignorance of their cause. 17 
i.e. it covers a greater distance in the same time (849 a 6 ff.). What is the sense of para 
phusin in this passage? Nothing speaks for sense 1: there is no break in the natural order 
of cause and effect here, only the constraint of a body’s natural motion in a way that is 
subject to precise geometrical analysis. The closest match is evidently with sense 2: para 
phusin  referring  to  forced  motion in  the  Aristotelian  sense.  Yet  in  some  respects  the 
author’s  analysis  seems  remarkably  un-Aristotelian.  It  has  often  been  supposed  that 
because the subject under discussion in problem 1 is the motion of the balance, the author 
conceives of motion along the tangent as kata phusin because it is directed downward, 
i.e. in the direction of the natural tendency of a heavy body. But in fact it becomes clear 
in the sequel that this analysis is a very general one that is meant to apply to all cases of 
circular movement – including the rotation of a circle that moves in a plane parallel to the 
ground, e.g. a potter’s wheel (cf. ch. 8, 851 b 19 - 21; 852 a 1 ff.). The author’s idea 
seems to be that an object moving in a circle will naturally fly off at a tangent, however 
the circle may be oriented with respect to the ground. At most, then, we may say that 
para phusin is used here of motion that is caused by external force or compulsion. The 
upshot is that mechanical effects that are explicable in terms of circular motion involve a 
certain amount of external force or compulsion.  
 
In the remaining 34 problems the author largely follows the program stated in the 
introduction: mechanical phenomena are analyzed in terms of the lever, the balance, or 
by direct application of the circular motion principle. It is notable that the author does not 
use the phrase para phusin again after problem 1, not even in connection with the lever. 
Moreover in a number of cases the mechanical effect in question can be understood as 
assisting rather than working against a body’s natural motion. Problem 8 discusses why 
circular  and  round  bodies  are  easiest  to  move  (851  b  15  ff.).  In  the  case  of  a circle 
standing upright on a horizontal surface (i.e. a wheel), one reason is that the circle is 
moved in a direction in which it already inclines (repei) by virtue of its weight (851 b 27 
- 33). In the case of a circle that turns in a plane parallel to the ground (such as a potter’s 
wheel), the author makes a clear reference back to the analysis of circular motion in 
chapter 1: movement along the tangent is natural (kata phusin), and the mover pushes a 
circle along the tangent (852 a 7 - 13). In both cases, then, to set a circle in rotation is to 
cause it to move in a way in which it is already naturally disposed to move; machines that 
take advantage of the ease with which round and circular bodies can be moved thus assist 
their natural movement rather than working against it.
46  Problem 19 asks why an ax 
placed on a block of wood does not split the wood if a heavy weight is placed on it, but 
does if one raises it and strikes the wood. The reason is that “a heavy object takes on the 
movement of weight more when it is moving than when it is at rest” (853 b 19 - 20). That 
is,  the  force  generated  by  the  blow  augments  the  natural  downward  tendency  of  the 
weight of the ax. In such cases, the mechanical effect in question is para phusin only in 
the sense that it goes beyond what unaided nature can achieve (sense 4) and involves 
some external force or compulsion (sense 2).  
 
                                                          
46Cf. problem 11, which asks why heavy weights are more easily carried on rollers than on carts. The 
reason, in part, is that “a weight resting on rollers moves at two points of them, the ground supporting from 
below and the weight pressing from above; for the circle is revolving at both these points, and is impelled 
in the direction it travels” (852 a 34 - 37). 18 
In sum, the author’s conception of the art-nature relationship is best understood as 
the claim that art goes beyond n ature in bringing about effects that unaided nature cannot 
(para phusin in sense 4). This is supported by the work’s opening, where the apparent 
opposition between art and nature in fact amounts to a contrast between the complexity of 
the  former  and  the  simplicity  and  uniformity  of  the  latter.  Nothing  in  the  opening 
suggests that art produces a break or rupture in the order of nature (para phusin in sense 
1), or even that it works against the natural tendencies of bodies (para phusin in sense 2). 
Rather, the author describes art as going beyond what unaided nature can achieve by 
making creative use of the behavior of nature itself. This calls for the kind of inventive 
ingenuity  associated  with  the  term  mêchanê,  understood  as  a  ‘device’  that  makes  it 
possible to achieve results that could not otherwise be attained. Insofar as art is able to 
‘conquer’  nature,  it  is  by  the  creative  combination  of  natural  regularities  to  produce 
effects that are beneficial for human beings. What distinguishes mechanical effects in 
particular is their unusual or paradoxical character, as manifest in a reversal of the normal 
or natural relationship between forces (para phusin in sense 3). The remainder of the 
introduction and the author’s detailed discussion of 35 mechanical problems confirms 
this  analysis.  Mechanical  phenomena  are  wondrous  because  of  their  unusual  or 
paradoxical character; but this disappears once they have been explained, and it implies 
no break in the order of nature. Circular motion is the fundamental explanation of all 
mechanical phenomena; it is analyzed in precise geometrical terms as a combination of 
motion kata phusin along the tangent and para phusin towards the center. This analysis 
suggests that the author conceives of mechanical phenomena as involving some external 
force or compulsion (para phusin in sense 2). But several of the mechanical phenomena 
the author discusses involve the use of force to augment rather than to counter an object’s 
natural tendencies. The claim that mechanics involves some external force or compulsion 
is simply a way of indicating that mechanics, as a technê, modifies the natural behavior 
of the objects with which it deals. And this is best understood as the claim that mechanics 
goes ‘beyond nature’ in the sense that I have explained.  
 
As  a  confirmation  of  this  interpretation,  I  note  that  Latin  translators  and 
commentators of the early modern period tend to render the phrase para phusin in the 
Mechanical Problems as praeter naturam.
47  The basic meaning of the Latin word praeter 
is ‘beyond’; though it can also mean ‘against’ or ‘contrary to’, it is much more likely to 
have the former meaning, especially since the phrase contra naturam was available to 
express  the  latter  idea  (and  Latin contra  can  only mean  ‘against’).  From  at  least  the 
thirteenth century on, medieval and early modern writers recognized a category of what 
may be called ‘preternatural phenomena’ – phenomena which, though they went ‘beyond 
nature’ (praeter naturam) in being unusual or exceptional, did not lie outside the order of 
nature. The early moderns’ tendency to render para phusin as praeter naturam in the 
Mechanical Problems suggests that they placed mechanical phenomena in this category; 
in doing so, they faithfully rendered the author’s idea that mechanics goes beyond nature 
without breaking the natural order.
48   
                                                          
47Noted by Micheli (1995, 26 n. 21); for representative examples see Piccolomini 1565, Monantheuil 1599, 
del Monte 1588,  and cf. section 6 below. 
48For the category of preternatural phenomena see Daston and Park 1998, 121-2, noting its appearance in 
Aquinas;  the  adjective  praeternaturalis  is  found  in  Albertus  Magnus  (Metaph.  II.xi;  cf. OED 19 
 
This  interpretation  of  the  author’s  view  of  the  art-nature  relationship  has  the 
further  advantage  of  ascribing  to  him  a  view  that  captures  the  actual  relationship  of 
technology to nature much better than the notion of struggle against a hostile nature. 
Though machines do bring about effects that go beyond what unaided nature can achieve, 
it is implausible to suppose that this is because they consistently strive to thwart nature’s 
activity. While some machines may cause bodies to move in ways that are contrary to 
their natural tendencies, it is by no means the case that all do. And even if a machine does 
produce  such  motions,  there  is  no  reason  to  think  that  it  does  so  by  forcing  all  its 
components to act against their natural tendencies. It is much more plausible to suppose 
that in building a machine a craftsman takes advantage of the natural properties of its 
components,  combining  them  in  such  a  way  that  they  produce  an  effect  that  nature 
cannot. The essence of the machine, and indeed of technê in general, lies in the creative 
combination of natural regularities. This seems to me an insight that not only captures the 
view  expressed  by  the  author  of  the  Mechanical  Problems,  but  one  which  is  also 
substantially correct.
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4. Mechanics and the imitation of nature 
Now that we have clarified the conception of the art-nature relationship in the 
Mechanical Problems, we can return to the question broached at the end of section 2: 
does mechanics occupy a distinctive position in its relationship to nature vis a vis the 
other technai in antiquity? As far as the Mechanical Problems is concerned, this question 
must be answered in the negative. In fact, Aristotle’s remark at Phys. 199 a 15 - 17 that 
art  either  imitates  nature  or  completes  what  nature  leaves  unfinished  provides  an 
excellent  illustration  of  the  art-nature  relationship  as  the  author  of  the  Mechanical 
Problems  conceives  of  it.  As  we  have  seen  in  section  2,  the  notion  of  imitation 
presupposed  by  Aristotle’s  remark  goes  far  beyond  mere mimicry.  Art’s  imitation  of 
nature must be understood in terms of a close analogy between artificial and natural 
processes: art imitates nature by acting in an analogous manner. And Aristotle’s remark 
also gives a precise sense to the notion that art goes beyond nature: art brings about 
results that nature cannot and thus remedies nature’s deficiencies, but it does so by acting 
in the way that nature would act if it could bring about such results. The role of art is to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
s.v. ‘preternatural’). By the late sixteenth century the term preternatural had entered English, where it 
referred to something “That is out of the ordinary course of nature; beyond, surpassing, or differing from 
what is natural; non-natural” (OED s.v. a). Though originally distinct in meaning from supernatural, it was 
sometimes  synonymous  with  it;  cf. OED  s.v. b.  For  the  distinction  between  the  preternatural  and  the 
supernatural cf. the definition of the former in Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary of 1913: “Beyond 
or different from what is natural, or according to the regular course of things, but not clearly supernatural or 
miraculous;  strange;  inexplicable;  extraordinary;  uncommon;  irregular;  abnormal;  as,  a  preternatural 
appearance; a preternatural stillness; a preternatural presentation (in childbirth) or labor.” 
49Cf. the general remarks of Schadewaldt on the way in which technology can be said to surpass nature 
(1970a, 897): “Die Technik greift die Stoffe und Kräfte der selbstgewachsenen Natur auf, formt sie durch 
Trennen  und  Neu-Verbindungen  um  und  gestaltet  sie  in  charakteristischer  Weise  in  diesen  neuen 
Kombinationen auf die Bedürfnisse des Menschen hin. Mit anderen Worten: Die Technik kultiviert die 
Rohstoffe, die die Natur ihr liefert, und mit diesem Kultivieren, Veredeln auf den Menschen hin mag sie 
wohl auch die Natur in bestimmter Weise ‘übertreffen’.” 20 
build on and extend nature’s activities in a way that is beneficial for human beings. Art 
goes beyond nature and thus may be said to ‘conquer’ it, but only by imitating nature 
itself. This is precisely the idea expressed at the opening of the Mechanical Problems: art 
makes creative use of natural regularities to go beyond what nature itself can achieve. 
The author seems to identify the use of external compulsion or force as one respect in 
which mechanics goes beyond nature. But as noted in section 2, for Aristotle the art-
nature distinction often amounts to no more than a distinction between an external and 
internal principle of change; the actual process of change is identical, whether the cause 
is internal or external. Given this, the notion that mechanics involves external force or 
compulsion by no means stands in the way of a close analogy between mechanical and 
natural processes. Mechanics brings about effects that unaided nature cannot, but it does 
so by acting in a way that is analogous to that of nature itself.
50   
 
                                                          
50The importance of Physics 199 a 15 - 17 for the interpretation of the Mechanical Problems is noted and 
emphasized  by  Schadewaldt  (1970b,  916-917); Schneider  (1989,  263);  and  Micheli  (1995,  30-1).  The 
ancient commentators held that in remarking that art brings to completion what nature cannot Aristotle had 
in mind the specific example of medicine, understood as an art that perfects an internal principle of change 
(cf. Simplicius, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca [CAG] 
9, 378.6 ff.; Philoponus, In Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria, CAG 16, 310.16 ff.; 316.21 ff.). 
On  this  view  the  remark  would  not  be  applicable  to  mechanics,  insofar  as  mechanics  involves  the 
modification and rearrangement of material bodies rather than the perfection of their internal principle of 
change. But first, what Aristotle says is that art is able to bring to completion (epitelein) what nature 
cannot,  not  that  art  is  able  to  bring  nature  itself  to  a  greater  state  of  perfection.  Nature  is  viewed  as 
deficient, and art as making up for these deficiencies; cf. Arist. Pol. 1336 b 40 - 1337 a 3 (“The poets who 
divide ages by sevens are in the main right: but we should observe the divisions actually made by nature; 
for  the  deficiencies  (to  prosleipon)  of  nature  are  what  art  (technê)  and  education  seek  to  remedy 
(anaplêroun).”) and Protrepticus, fr. 13 (quoted below). Moreover, I see no reason to suppose that Aristotle 
is thinking of medicine at Physics 199 a 15 ff. There is no mention of medicine in the immediate context; 
the example Aristotle gives is of the building of a house, which involves the  arrangement and  fitting 
together  of  natural  substances  rather  than  a  perfection  of  their  internal  principle  of  change.  In  fact 
housebuilding or shipbuilding (cf. 199 b 28 - 9) provides an excellent example of art going beyond nature 
in a way that is suited to human needs. Medicine, by contrast, would be a poor example to illustrate the 
ability of art to bring nature to a state of greater perfection, for medicine (understood as treatment of the 
sick) simply restores a patient’s nature to its original state of health rather than making it more perfect. 
Finally we may consider fragment 13 of Aristotle’s Protrepticus, which provides a sort of commentary on 
the thought of Physics 199 a 15 ff.: “Natural things come to be for the sake of something and always exist 
for the sake of something better than artificial things: for nature does not imitate (mimeitai) art, but art 
imitates nature, and it exists to render aid and make up for (anaplêroun) what nature leaves undone (ta 
paraleipomena tês phuseôs). For nature is evidently able to bring to completion (epitelein) some things by 
itself without any aid, while other things it is barely or not at all able to bring to completion, as is the case 
with generation: for some seeds will sprout in whatever ground they are sown without any cultivation, 
while others have need of the art of farming. Similarly, some animals attain their full nature by themselves, 
while human beings have need of many arts for their survival – both when they are first born and again for 
their later nourishment.” Here art is pictured as helping nature (understood as the internal principle in the 
seed, or in a human being) to attain a greater state of completion than it could if unaided. But the main 
point lies in art’s ability to modify the behavior of the natural world in beneficial ways — ways that enable 
human beings to make up for their natural deficiencies. Again, the background is provided by accounts of 
cultural history in which human beings are pictured as inferior to animals in qualities such as strength and 
speed, but as making up for this by means of intelligence and technê. The locus classicus for this idea is the 
story of Prometheus and Epimetheus as told in Plato’s Protagoras (320 c ff.): thanks to Epimetheus’ 
forgetfulness,  human  beings  come  into  the  world  “naked,  unshod,  unbedded,  and  unarmed”  (321c); 
Prometheus gives them the technai to compensate for these disadvantages. 21 
In this connection it is relevant to note that the idea that mechanics imitates nature 
is  associated  with  two  branches  of  ancient  mechanics  in  particular:  the  building  of 
automata and of armillary spheres to represent the motions of the heavenly bodies. The 
notion that these branches of mechanics imitate natural motions appears in both Pappus 
and  Proclus.
51    The  idea  of  mechanics  as  imitating  nature  is  also  prominent  in  the 
following  passage  from  the  late  Latin  writer  Cassiodorus  (from  a  letter  addressed  to 
Boethius):  
 
All fields of study – the combined efforts of the wise – seek to know the 
power of nature, insofar as they are able; a machine is the only thing that 
seeks on the contrary to imitate (imitari) and, if it may be said, in some 
respects even strives to surpass (superare) it. For this art is distinguished by 
having made Daedalus fly, by having caused an iron Cupid to hang in the 
temple of Diana without any fastening; even today it makes mute things 
sing, lifeless things live, immobile things move. The mechanician is, if it 
may be said, almost on a par with nature; by throwing open what is hidden, 
altering what is manifest, sporting with what is wondrous, he simulates so 
well that what is not doubted to be artificial (compositum) is judged to be the 
real thing.
52  
  
                                                          
51For the building of automata as imitation cf. Pappus’ reference to “those who seem to imitate (mimeisthai) 
the  motions  of  living  things  through  ropes  and  cables,  as  does  Hero  in  the  Automata  and  Balances” 
(1024.25-27 Hultsch) and Proclus’ mention of the manufacture of devices that operate “through ropes and 
cables,  which  imitate  the  motions  and  impulses  of  living  things”  (In  Prim.  Euc.  Elem.,  p.  41.13-15 
Friedlein.)  Pappus refers to armillary spheres as an “image” (eikôn) of the heavens; cf. also Cic. Tusc. 1.63 
and Cassiodorus, Variae 1.45: Parva de illa (sc. arte mechanica) referimus, cui caelum imitari fas est.  
In Pappus the notion of mechanics as imitation is combined with the idea that it brings about 
effects that are para phusin. Cf. 1022.8-12 Hultsch (from the introduction to Pappus’ account of mechanics 
in general): “[Mechanics] examines bodies at rest and in motion, and their locomotion in general; it not 
only assigns causes of natural (kata phusin) motion, but also by forcing bodies from their natural places 
contrary to their natures (para phusin) it devises means of setting them into opposite movements.” Here, 
however, the phrase para phusin is clearly used in its Aristotelian sense of motion that is produced by 
compulsion and opposed to a body’s natural inclination (sense 2 as distinguished above). Notably, Pappus 
describes mechanics as concerned with both the natural and the forced motion of physical bodies. And 
elsewhere  in  Pappus’  account  the  phrase  para  phusin  is  used  in  connection  with  only  one  branch  of 
mechanics,  the  art  of  those  who  “raise  large  weights  contrary  to  nature  (para  phusin)  by  means  of 
machines, moving them with a smaller force (dunamis)” (1024.14-16 Hultsch). For Pappus the notion that 
mechanics acts para phusin no more implies a break in the order of nature than it does for the author of the 
Mechanical Problems; both forced and natural motions fall under the scope of mechanics, and both can be 
explained in precise geometrical terms. There is no real tension between the notion that mechanics imitates 
nature and the notion that it brings about effects that are para phusin in the sense that Pappus describes. 
52Cassiodorus,  Variae  1.45  Mommsen:  Universae  disciplinae,  cunctus  prudentium  labor  naturae 
potentiam, ut tantum possint, nosse perquirunt: mechanisma solum est quod illam ex contrariis appetit 
imitari  et,  si  fas  est  dicere,  in  quibusdam  etiam  nititur  velle  superare.  Haec  enim  fecisse  dinoscitur 
Daedalum volare; haec enim ferreum Cupidinem in Dianae templo sine aliqua illigatione pendere; haec 
hodie facit muta cantare, insensata vivere, immobilia moveri. Mechanicus, si fas est dicere, paene socius 
est  naturae,  occulta  reserans,  manifesta  convertens,  miraculis  ludens,  ita  pulchre  simulans,  ut  quod 
compositum non ambigitur, veritas aestimetur. I am grateful to Bill Newman for the reference and to 
Malcolm Hyman for discussing the translation with me. 22 
Here the notion of conquering or surpassing nature (superat) appears alongside that of 
imitation  (imitari).  The  passage  suggests  that  the  mechanician  can  surpass  nature  by 
imitating it, in the sense that he creates an imitation that is more lifelike than nature 
itself.
53   
In Cassiodorus it is clear that what the mechanician creates is but an imitation of 
nature: the observer who is not in on the trick is fooled, though the craftsman himself is 
not.  But  other  ancient  sources  raise  at  least  the  theoretical  possibility  of  building  a 
machine that not only mimics or simulates a living thing, but one that actually replicates 
the very processes going on inside living things. Evidence for this is provided by Gregory 
of Nyssa’s On the Soul and Resurrection, a work that is cast as a dialogue between 
Gregory himself and his sister Macrina. Plagued by grief at the death of a close friend, 
Gregory comes to Macrina in search of consolation; the two then engage in a lengthy 
discussion that raises fundamental questions about the nature of the soul. Throughout 
Macrina  speaks  from  the  perspective  of  a  committed  Christian  whose  views  are 
thoroughly informed by the heritage of Greek philosophy. She gradually brings Gregory 
from a state in which he is tempted by Epicurean materialism to a full acceptance of the 
Christian doctrine of resurrection of the flesh. At one point early in their conversation, 
Gregory  asks  whether  the existence  of a  certain  kind  of  machine  does  not  make  the 
appeal to an immaterial soul superfluous: 
  
What ... if someone were to say that, just as there is something material 
common  to  the  perceptible  nature  of  the  elements,  but  great  differences 
between each form of matter according to its distinctive character...there is a 
faculty (dunamis) compounded from these according to proportion, a faculty 
that brings about intellectual impressions and movements by virtue of its 
natural peculiarity and power (dunamis)? Indeed, we often see such things 
brought about by the makers of machines (mêchanopoioi), at whose hands 
matter arranged in an artistic fashion (technikôs) imitates nature (mimeitai 
tên phusin): the matter displays resemblance not only in its shape, but it also 
moves,  and  feigns  (hupokrinetai)  a  kind  of  voice...and  we  discern  no 
intellectual faculty (noêtê dunamis) bringing about these individual things...
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The success of the builders of automata in imitating life prompts Gregory to ask whether 
the kinds of behavior normally attributed to the intellectual faculty of the soul cannot be 
explained  by  virtue  of  some  "motive  faculty  (kinêtikê  dunamis)  in  the  nature  of  the 
elements  within  us.”
55    Macrina  responds  that the construction  of  a machine  requires 
technê, which in turn implies the existence of a creative intelligence and a soul:  
 
To know in this way how to take in hand and arrange lifeless matter, so that 
the art (technê) incorporated into machines practically becomes a soul to the 
matter, and thus the matter acts out (kathupokrinetai) motion and sound, and 
                                                          
53The idea of art that seems more real than the real thing has a long tradition, going back to references in 
early Greek poetry to the mythical craftsman Daedalus and his stunningly faithful depictions of living 
things. See Morris 1992, 217 ff.; I am grateful to Bill Newman for this reference. 
54De an. et resurr. 33 C-36 A Migne. 
55De an. et resurr. 36 A 10-12 Migne. 23 
shapes,  and  similar  things:  this  is  a  proof  that  there  is  something  in  the 
human being by means of which it is naturally able to conceive of these 
things through its faculty (dunamis) of contemplation and discovery, and 
first to construct machines (mêchanêmata) in thought, then bring them into 
existence through art (technê) and display its thought in matter.
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Macrina continues with a remarkable passage that describes the elementary principles of 
pneumatics that the maker of any such machine needs to know. But, she claims, if the 
capacity for creating such wondrous effects were present in the nature of the elements 
themselves, machines would arise spontaneously.
57  Besides showing that the notion that 
mechanics imitates nature was sometimes understood as implying a very close analogy 
between  them,  Gregory’s  objection  and  Macrina’s  response  provide  a  beautiful 
illustration of the idea that the essence of a machine lies in the creative arrangement of its 
components.  The  operation  of  a  machine  is  fully  natural  in  the  sense  that  it  can  be 
explained by the natural behavior of the substances of which it is made, once they have 
been placed into a certain arrangement. The contribution of technê lies in the creation of 
such  an  arrangement.  Even  if  the  processes  that  go  on  in  the  living  thing  could  be 
replicated in a machine, there is still a place for an immaterial soul: for machines do not 
make themselves.  
 
Finally on the subject of imitation, a passage from book 10 of Vitruvius suggests 
that human beings learned to construct machines from the study of nature itself:  
 
Now all machinery (machinatio) has its origin in nature, and is founded on 
the teaching and instruction of the revolution (uersatio) of the world. Let us 
but observe and contemplate the natural system formed by the sun, the moon 
and  the  five  planets;  unless  these  revolved  by  skillful  contrivance 
(machinata uersarentur), we would not have had the alternation of day and 
night, nor the ripening of fruits. Thus, when our ancestors had seen that this 
was so, they took examples from nature, and by imitating them (imitantes) 
and being led on by divine facts, developed applications that are serviceable 
in life. Some things, with a view to greater convenience, they worked out by 
means of machines and their revolutions (uersationibus), others by means of 
engines; and so, whatever they found useful in practice, they took care to 
improve by means of study, arts, and doctrines established step by step.
58   
 
                                                          
56De an. et resurr. 36 B Migne. 
57De an. et resurr. 36 C - 40 A Migne. 
58Vitruv.  10.1.4,  pp.  5-6  Callebat/Fleury:  Omnis  autem  est  machinatio  rerum  natura  procreata  ac 
praeceptrice  et  magistra  mundi  uersatione  instituta.  Namque  animaduertamus  primum  et  aspiciamus 
continentem  solis,  lunae,  quinque  etiam  stellarum  naturam;  quae  ni  machinata  uersarentur,  non 
habuissemus interdum lucem nec fructum maturitates. Cum ergo maiores haec ita esse animaduertissent, e 
rerum  natura  sumpserunt  exempla  et  ea  imitantes  inducti  rebus  diuinis  commodas  uitae  perfecerunt 
explicationes.  Itaque  comparauerunt,  ut  essent  expeditiora,  alia  machinis  et  earum  uersationibus, 
nonnulla organis, et ita quae animaduerterunt ad usum utilia esse, studiis, artibus, institutis gradatim 
augenda doctrinis curauerunt. 24 
The first remarkable feature of this passage is its emphasis on the natural character of 
mechanics:  far  from  any  notion  that  machines  somehow  break  the  order  of  nature, 
mechanical  motions  are  produced  by  nature  itself.  Second,  the  passage  identifies  the 
imitation of nature as the driving factor in the development of technology. By imitating 
nature’s own movements, human beings learn to build machines that go beyond nature in 
ways  that  improve  the  human  condition.  The  passage  in  fact  provides  an  excellent 
illustration of Aristotle’s dictum that art imitates nature and completes what nature leaves 
unfinished.  Moreover,  as  in  Aristotle,  the  imitation  in  Vitruvius  is  more  than  mere 
mimicry. Like the author of the Mechanical Problems, Vitruvius claims that the operation 
of machines can be understood in terms of circular motion.
59  The present passage implies 
not only that human beings found examples of machines in nature, but also that they 
discovered the basic principle that explains their operation from the study of nature. By 
learning the principles underlying the motions found in nature, human beings gain the 
understanding needed to build machines that go beyond anything that nature produces on 
its own.
60   
 
5. Mechanics and the study of nature 
I now return to the question of how mechanics could yield knowledge of nature. 
The evidence considered above suggests two ways in which could do so. 
  
First, mechanics like any other technê could provide models for the understanding 
of natural objects and processes. Aristotle, for example, often draws parallels between 
mechanics  and  nature.  In  the  biological  works  nature  is  frequently  described  as  a 
craftsman that displays the inventive ingenuity associated with the terms mêchanê and 
mêchanasthai.
61    At  De  Motu  Animalium  701  b  1  ff. Aristotle  likens  the  motion  of 
animals to that of automatic puppets (automata), a type of mechanical device. At De 
Motu Animalium 698 b 21 ff. he appeals to the fact that it is impossible to move a boat 
unless one rests against an external fixed point to show that the motion of animals and of 
the cosmos as a whole is only possible in relation to an external fixed point or object. 
While each of these parallels must be examined on its own terms, taken as a group they 
suggest that Aristotle did not hesitate to draw analogies between mechanics and nature, or 
between forced and natural motion, and that such analogies played an important role in 
the study of nature. 
 
Second,  mechanics  could  provide  knowledge  of  nature  through  the  use  of 
mathematics.  Important  evidence  for  this  idea  is  provided  by  the  opening  of  the 
                                                          
59See Vitruv. 10.1.1, p. 4 Callebat/Fleury: Machina est continens e materia coniunctio maximas ad onerum 
motus habens uirtutes. Ea mouetur ex arte circulorum rotundationibus, quam Graeci kyklikēn kinēsin 
appellant. 
60In this connection it should be noted that Aristotle himself mentions the circular motion principle that is 
so important in the Mechanical Problems (i.e. that of two circles rotating around the same center, the larger 
moves more quickly) in connection with celestial motions; see Cael. 289 b 34 ff. Cf. Krafft 1970, 67 f.; 
Schneider 1989, 261. 
61GA 717 a 30, 745 a 31; PA 652 a 31, 652 b 21, 653 b 34, etc. 25 
Mechanical Problems, immediately after the author describes such problems as those in 
which “the lesser master the greater”:  
 
These are not entirely identical with physical problems nor entirely separate 
from  them,  but  they  have  a  share  in  both  mathematical  and  physical 
speculations:  for  the  ‘how’  (to  hôs)  in  them  is  made  clear  through 
mathematics,  while  the  ‘about  what’  (to  peri  ho)  is  made  clear  through 
physics.
62   
 
This is the author’s most explicit attempt to clarify the relationship between mechanics, 
physics, and mathematics. The contrast he has in mind between the ‘how’ (to hôs) and 
the ‘about what’ (to peri ho) is not immediately clear. But in fact it seems to express a 
conception of mechanics close to that of Aristotle himself. In several passages Aristotle 
mentions mechanics as a science like optics, harmonics, and astronomy, each of which 
uses mathematics to study physical bodies.  In Posterior Analytics A 9 Aristotle states 
that geometrical proofs can be applied to mechanics and optics, just as the proofs of 
arithmetic  can  be  applied  to  harmonics  (76  a  23  -  25).  In  Posterior  Analytics  A  13 
mechanics  (ta  mêchanika)  is  said  to  be  subordinate  to  (literally  ‘under’,  hupo) 
stereometry (a kind of geometry), just as optics is to geometry, harmonics to arithmetic, 
and “study of the phenomena” (ta phainomena) to astronomy (78 b 36 - 39). Aristotle’s 
conception of subordinate sciences raises many problems, but two features of it are clear 
and relevant in the present context. First, it is mathematics that provides the explanation 
in the subordinate sciences. For example, a proposition in optics can be demonstrated by 
means of geometry, and a proposition in harmonics by means of arithmetic (A. Po. 75 b 
14 ff.). The subordinate science is concerned with the fact (to hoti) while mathematics 
supplies  the  explanation  (to  dioti).  Second,  the  subordinate  sciences  deal  with  the 
mathematical properties of physical bodies. In Metaphysics M 3, 1078 a 14 ff. Aristotle 
states that neither harmonics nor optics conceives of (theôrei) its subject matter qua pitch 
or qua visual ray; rather, they conceive of their subject matter qua numbers or lines, and 
the same holds true for mechanics (mêchanikê). In this chapter Aristotle is attempting to 
clarify the relationship of mathematical objects to physical bodies.  His point is that since 
mathematical properties belong to physical bodies, the mathematician in fact studies the 
properties of such bodies.  But he does not study them qua properties of physical bodies; 
there are many things that can be said about such bodies simply as (qua) lines or planes, 
and it is such things that the mathematician studies (cf. 1078 a 5 ff.). The harmonic 
theorist  or  the  student  of  optics  incurs  no  falsity  in  abstracting  away  the  physical 
properties of pitch or the visual ray and considering only their mathematical attributes for 
the purposes of analysis. Physics B 2 adopts a somewhat different perspective on the 
question of the subject matter of the subordinate sciences. It begins by raising the general 
questions  of  how  the  mathematician  differs  from  the  physicist,  and  whether  or  not 
astronomy is a part of physics (193 b 22 - 30). As in Metaphysics M 3 the mathematician 
is said to study the attributes of physical bodies, though not qua attributes of such bodies 
(193 b 31 - 35). At 194 a 7-12 Aristotle contrasts geometry with optics, harmonics, and 
astronomy,  which  he  calls  the  ‘more  physical’  (phusikôtera)  branches  of  the 
mathematical sciences. Geometry studies (skopei) a physical line, but not qua physical; 
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optics studies a mathematical line, but qua physical, not qua mathematical. Prima facie 
Aristotle’s position here is opposed to that stated in Metaphysics M 3, for here he insists 
that the  ‘more  physical’  branches  of  mathematics consider their  objects  qua  physical 
bodies. But there is no real conflict if we take his point to be that the difference between 
mathematics  and  the  subordinate  sciences  lies  in  the  need  for  the  latter  to  consider 
mathematical attributes as they occur in particular arrangements of physical bodies. The 
aim of the subordinate sciences is to explain the behavior of particular kinds of physical 
objects;  Aristotle’s  idea  seems  to  be  that  they  make  use  of  mathematics  to construct 
models that explain this behavior. The geometer is concerned with anything that can be 
demonstrated about lines and planes simply by virtue of their nature as lines and planes.  
But the astronomer is concerned only with those mathematical objects that accurately 
model the heavenly bodies and their motions; similarly the student of optics is concerned 
only with those arrangements of mathematical lines that correspond to the physical rays 
that  cause  optical  phenomena.  The  apparent  tension  with  the  Metaphysics  passage  is 
really just a matter of a difference of emphasis. In Metaphysics M 3 Aristotle’s emphasis 
is on the mathematical aspect of the subordinate sciences, i.e. on the point that they treat 
certain physical bodies as mathematical lines and numbers and incur no falsity in doing 
so.  Physics B 2 does not deny this; rather it makes the point that the astronomer or the 
student of optics does not study just any mathematical lines, but the ones involved in the 
explanation  of  certain  physical  phenomena.  Though  mechanics  is  not  mentioned  in 
Physics B 2, there is no reason to suppose that Aristotle did not consider it one of the 
‘more physical’ mathematical sciences. 
 
In stating that mathematics supplies knowledge of the ‘how’ (to hôs), the author 
of the Mechanical Problems indicates that it provides the explanatory element in such 
problems, just as Aristotle claims that explanation in the subordinate sciences is provided 
by mathematics. And in claiming that the ‘about what’ (to peri ho) is given by physics, 
the author echoes Aristotle’s idea that the subordinate sciences study physical bodies 
from a particular point of view. Mechanics uses mathematics to explain the motion of 
physical bodies, but it is distinct from mathematics in that it is concerned only with the 
movements  undergone  by  physical  bodies  in  certain  arrangements  and  under  certain 
conditions. This picture of the place of mechanics in relation to physics and mathematics 
is supported by the use of geometry in the Mechanical Problems itself.  Consider once 
again the discussion of problem 1. The author begins by asking why (dia tina aitian) 
larger balances are more accurate than smaller ones. The origin or principle (archê) of 
this is said to be the fact that a point on a larger circle travels faster than one on a smaller 
circle, when both are moved by the same force (848 b 1 - 9); this, in turn, is because a 
point on the circumference of a circle is moved by two motions (848 b 9 - 10).  After 
explaining and justifying this idea at some length (in part by making use of geometrical 
representations  of  bodies  in  motion)  the  author  states  the  basic  physical  idea  that 
underlies his analysis: if two bodies are moving under the influence of the same force, the 
one that is more deflected (ekkrouesthai) travels more slowly (849 a 6 - 19). A point on a 
smaller  circle  is  more  deflected  than  one  on  a  greater  circle,  i.e. it  has  a  greater 
component of its motion directed towards the center (para phusin) rather than along the 
tangent (kata phusin). To establish this fact the author appeals to an elaborate geometrical 
construction in which lines in the geometrical figure correspond to different components 27 
of the body’s motion; he uses this to prove that the  that the line corresponding to para 
phusin motion is larger in the case of the smaller circle (849 a 21 - 849 b 19). Finally the 
author states that “the reason (aitia) why the point further from the center is moved more 
quickly by the same force is now clear” (849 b 19 - 22), and proceeds to apply this result 
to the original question of why larger balances are more accurate (849 b 22 - 850 a 2). 
Thus,  it  is  the  use  of  geometry  to  represent  mechanical  movements  that  supplies  the 
explanatory element in mechanics, for geometry explains why the point on the larger 
radius  moves  more  quickly.  More  generally,  the  procedure  followed  throughout  the 
Mechanical  Problems  may  be  described  as  the  use  of  geometrical  models  to  explain 
physical  phenomena.  The  key  step  in  the  author’s  analysis  of  all  the  problems  he 
discusses is the application of a simple model: the lever, the balance, or the circle. It is 
the application of the model that supplies the explanation.  For example, consider the 
beginning of problem 4: 
 
Why  do  the  rowers  in  the  middle  of  the  ship  contribute  most  to  its 
movement?  Is it because the oar acts like a lever (mochlos)?  For the 
thole-pin is the fulcrum (for it is fixed), and the sea is the weight, which 
the oar drives back; the sailor is the mover of the lever.
63  
 
Treating the oar as a lever explains why the rowers amidships exert the greatest force; but 
the explanation of how the lever operates depends ultimately on the geometrical analysis 
set out in problem 1. Thus the author may be viewed as using geometry to explain the 
behavior of a certain set of physical phenomena in a way that closely matches Aristotle’s 
description of the subordinate sciences. 
 
I note in conclusion that none of Aristotle’s fleeting references to mechanics (the 
three passages discussed above) suggests that mechanics is concerned with forced rather 
than natural motion. All of Aristotle’s subordinate sciences deal with the mathematical 
aspects  of  physical  bodies;  all  occupy a  middle  ground  between  physics  and  various 
branches  of  mathematics.  Thus,  though distinct  from  physics,  mechanics  can  provide 
knowledge of physical objects, and in this way can contribute to the knowledge of nature. 
It  is  true  that  there  is  a  contrast  to  be  drawn  with  the  early  modern  period,  when 
mechanics comes to be regarded as a part of physics itself rather than a closely related 
discipline.  But the difference here results more from Aristotle’s notion of mathematical 
abstraction than from any idea that mechanics is inherently ‘contrary to nature’.  
 
6. Early Modern Reflections 
In  the early  modern  period  the  Mechanical  Problems  became the  focus  of  an 
extensive commentary tradition to which a number of humanists, mathematicians, and 
engineers made significant contributions.
64  The work’s striking and problematic opening, 
with  its  important  implications  for  the  understanding  of  the  art-nature  relationship, 
naturally attracted a good deal of attention, and the remarks of a number of commentators 
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64For an overview of this literature and those who contributed to it see Rose and Drake 1971. 28 
provide  close  parallels  to  the  analysis  given  above.  In  this  section  I  present  four 
illustrations  of  this  in  chronological  order,  each  drawn  from  a  late  sixteenth-century 
source.
65  
 
1.  Alessandro Piccolomini’s highly influential paraphrase of the Mechanical Problems 
first appeared in Latin in 1547; a second edition appeared in 1565, and the work was 
translated  into  Italian  in  1582.
66  Piccolomini  reads  the  opening  of  the  Mechanical 
Problems as claiming that art operates differently from nature, since it seeks to further 
human ends. But art also imitates nature, since it acts in just the way that nature would 
act if it could achieve the effects brought about by art:  
 
For art, although it imitates nature and assists it, nevertheless brings about 
many things in a way different from it, with a view to our needs. But it 
must not be considered any less an imitator (imitatrix) of nature for that 
reason, since it brings about whatever it does in the way that nature itself 
would,  if  it  did  so.  For  while  nature  always  acts  in  the  same  way  in 
whatever it does, if unimpeded, art, because what is useful, necessary, and 
helpful for us is varied, also proceeds in a varied manner: in whatever path 
it takes, it also follows nature. If then it should come about that we are not 
content  with  the  simplicity  of  nature  (which  indeed  because  of  its 
simplicity is in no way diverse) on account of our varied needs, and thus 
undertake something against it, then it struggles and contends against us 
and  imposes  difficulty  on  our  efforts.  Hence  in  order  that  we  might 
overcome  this  difficulty  (or  rather  hesitation)  we  have  need  of  art,  by 
which we bring about our work, either destroying completely or at least 
demolishing to some degree the efforts of nature.
67   
 
Even if unimpeded nature always acts in the same way and art acts in different ways in 
different  situations,  art  must  be  understood  as  following  nature  in  all  cases.  Such 
opposition as there is between art and nature (it is more a question of ‘hesitation’ on 
nature’s part than active resistance) results solely from the fact that nature always acts in 
the same way, while the needs of human beings vary widely.  
 
2.   Giuseppi  Moletti,  Galileo’s  predecessor  as  professor  of  mathematics  at  Padua, 
lectured on the Mechanical Problems in 1581; his notes are preserved in manuscript form 
                                                          
65Cf. Micheli 1995, 144 ff. 
66On Piccolomini and his influence see Rose and Drake 1971, 81-85. 
67Piccolomini 1565, 8: Ars enim quamuis naturam imitetur, ac illam adiuuet, multa tamen ut usui nobis 
esse possint, aliter operatur ac illa facit. Neque minus ob id, naturae imitatrix existimari debet, quippe 
quae eo modo efficit quicquid facit, quo illamet efficeret, si illud faceret. Nam, tametsi natura eundem 
semper in quo uis opere suo, si non impeditur, seruet modum ars uero, propterea quod nostra utilitas, usus, 
atque commoditas multiplex est, multiplici etiam & illa itinere progrediatur: in quo uis tamen itinere, 
naturam & ipsa sequitur. Natura igitur, ex sua simplicitate nequaquam multiformis, si quando euenit, ut 
eius simplicitate, nos propter multiplices nostros usus non contenti, aduersus ipsam quippiam moliamur, 
tunc  illa  contra  nitens  ac  contendens,  nostris  conatibus  difficultatem  imponit.  quam  difficultatem,  seu 
potius haesitationem quandam ut superemus, arte quadam indigemus, qua tandem naturae conatus, uel 
penitus confringentes, uel aliqua saltem ex parte, demolientes, nostrum opus perficiamus. 29 
at the Bibliotheca Ambrosiana in Milan (MS S.100 sup., folios 1-199 passim).
68  The 
lectures are organized around particular topics, and several pages are dedicated to the 
question “whether the art of mechanics is found in the works of nature” (An in operibus 
naturae ars mechanica reperiatur) (fol. 22). The problem with which Moletti deals is a 
familiar one by now: how to reconcile the notion that art imitates nature with the ability 
of  art  to  bring  about  effects  that  nature  cannot,  and  with  the  ability  of  some  arts 
(especially mechanics) to conquer nature. Moletti’s strategy is to argue that mechanics 
conquers nature by applying principles that it has learned from nature itself. Thus the 
circular motion principle so important in the Mechanical Problems was discovered by 
observing  the  circular  motion  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  the  lever  was  discovered  by 
observing the joints of animals. In general the art of mechanics is found everywhere in 
nature, meaning that mechanics operates on fully natural principles.  
 
3.   Guidobaldo  del  Monte’s  1588  paraphrasis  of  Archimedes’  On  the  Equilibrium  of 
Planes  (In  duos  Archimedis  Aequeponderantium  libros  paraphrasis)  begins  with  a 
general discussion of mechanics that draws heavily on the opening of the Mechanical 
Problems.
69    Like  Moletti,  Guidobaldo’s  concern  is  to  explain  how  mechanics  can 
conquer nature while also imitating it. Nature appears to be conquered by art, though in 
fact it contributes greatly to its own defeat; mechanics is “as much an imitator of nature 
as a mighty opponent” (tam naturae emula, quam oppugnatrix valida).
70  The branch of 
mechanics in which art seems most clearly to conquer nature is that which is concerned 
with weights and equilibrium, and Guidobaldo turns immediately to this most challenging 
case.  Referring  to  Physics  B  8  as  well  as  the  opening  of  the  Mechanical  Problems, 
Guidobaldo claims that the operation of art can be conceived of in three ways: art either 
imitates nature, brings to completion what nature cannot, or produces results that are 
beyond or contrary to nature (praeter naturam). But in each of these cases, art must be 
understood as imitating nature. (1) It is evident that there are many arts whose goal is the 
imitation of nature, such as sculpture. (2) When art brings to completion what nature 
cannot, as in medicine, it functions as a tool (instrumentum) of nature, and thus brings 
about a natural effect; in such cases art acts in exactly the same way as nature would, if it 
brought about such effects (eodem modo operatur, ac si natura rem ipsam absque artis 
ope perficere posset). (3) Finally, in cases where art conquers nature and brings about a 
result  that  is  praeter  naturam,  it  does  so  by  producing  a  certain  disposition  or 
arrangement (dispositio) of bodies, the same arrangement that nature would produce if it 
intended to bring about those effects. Once bodies are placed in this arrangement their 
motions follow naturally, since it is natural for the arrangement itself to move in a certain 
way – even though individual bodies may move in ways contrary to their own individual 
nature. Thus in the case of the lever, it is natural for a large weight to be raised by a 
smaller one if the center of gravity lies between the fulcrum and the larger weight; the 
                                                          
68See Rose and Drake 1971, 93; Nobis 1969. My characterization of Moletti’s views is based on my own 
partial transcription of the relevant folio pages as well as the account of Nobis (1969, 331-2). 
69In the following I paraphrase the argument found on pp. 2-5 of del Monte 1588; an online version of this 
text is available at http://archimedes.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de. 
70The same idea is alluded to near the beginning of the preface to Guidobaldo’s influential Mechanicorum 
Liber of 1577, where mechanics is described as operating “against nature, though emulating its laws” 
(adversus naturam vel eiusdem emulata leges). 30 
larger weight moves upward naturally (naturaliter), even though such motion is contrary 
to its own individual nature.  
 
4.  Finally, a passage in Henri de Monantheuil’s 1599 commentary on the Mechanical 
Problems  describes  the  goal  of  art  as  ‘turning’  (convertere)  or  ‘accommodating’ 
(accommodare)  the  constant  behavior  of  nature  to  human  needs.
71    The  difficulty  of 
achieving this stimulates human beings to invent the arts. Following closely the passage 
of Vitruvius discussed above, Monantheuil argues that mechanics was discovered by the 
observation and imitation of nature (per imitationem rerum a natura procreatarum).
72  As 
in Moletti, the notion that mechanics is discovered by the imitation of nature is combined 
with  the  idea that  mechanical  processes  occur  in  nature  itself.  Monantheuil  describes 
mechanics as an art that goes praeter naturam, ‘beyond nature’, in a way that contributes 
to human needs.  
 
As has often been noted, Galileo at the beginning of Le Mecaniche (1593) insists 
that  mechanics  does  not  operate  by  tricking  nature;  nature  cannot  be  deceived,  and 
mechanical effects come about in a fully natural way.
73 Scholars have sometimes pointed 
to  this  claim  as  marking  a  radical  break  with  previous  views  of  mechanics,  and  in 
particular with the Mechanical Problems.
74 But the evidence presented in this section 
shows that the notion that mechanics operates ‘according to nature’ was quite common in 
the early modern period. Prompted by the striking opening of the Mechanical Problems, 
early modern authors attempted to reconcile the text’s apparent opposition of art and 
nature with their view that all processes must take place in a natural way. What is more, 
the discussion in sections 2 - 5 above shows that it would be a grave mistake to suppose 
that in doing so, these writers were introducing a radically new idea not present in the 
ancient texts on which they drew.
75 Rather than a hallmark of the rejection of Aristotle 
                                                          
71Monantheuil 1599, 8. Rose and Drake describe Monantheuil’s work as “the most complete and erudite of 
the sixteenth-century commentaries on the Mechanica, though not the most original in outlook” (1971, 
100). An online version of the text is available at http://archimedes.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de. 
72Monantheuil  1599,  9:  Homo  enim  inquit,  animaduertens  Solis,  Lunae,  &  reliquorum  planetarum 
continentes  motus,  &  machinationes  naturales,  sine  quibus  non  habuisset  in  terra  lucem,  &  fructuum 
maturitates  hinc  exempla  sumpsit,  &  ea  imitans,  inductus  rebus  diuinis,  commodas  vitae  perfecit 
explicationes. Itaque comparauit, vt essent expeditiora alia machinis, & earum versationibus: alia organis, 
quaeque obseruauit ad vsum vtilia esse studijs, artibus, institutis, doctrinis gradatim augenda curauit: hinc 
tandem extat ars quaedam generalis quae difficultati faciendorum praeter naturam ad vtiltiatem hominum 
succurrit. 
73Galileo  1960,  147:  “These  deceptions  (sc.  the  deceptions  of  mechanicians  who  attempt  to  achieve 
impossible effects) appear to me to have their principal cause in the belief which these craftsmen have, and 
continue to hold, in being able to raise great weights with a small force, as if with their machines they could 
cheat nature, whose instinct – nay, whose most firm constitution – is that no resistance may be overcome 
by a force more powerful than it. How false such a belief is, I hope to make most evident with true and 
rigorous demonstrations that we shall have as we go along.” It should be noted that Galileo attributes this 
view to practitioners, not to those who proposed the kinds of theories about the nature of mechanics with 
which I am concerned in the present section. 
74Cf. Krafft 1970, 160-8. 
75For one example of this cf. Hooykaas 1963, who exaggerates the originality of Monantheuil’s position. 
Krafft (1970 n. 262 a) recognizes the contribution of Moletti, but evidently thinks it exceptional. 31 
that supposedly characterized the crucial phase in the rise of modern science, the notion 
that mechanics operates according to nature is in fact a deeply Aristotelian idea.
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